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Abstract
Saudi Arabia has been focused on diversification of its economy and attracting
foreign investors. Countries that provide strong shareholder protection are more
likely to attract foreign investors. However, there is a need for greater protection of
minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. This is because Saudi’s companies law fails
to equip minority shareholders with adequate protective rights. A current issue with
the new Saudi companies law can be linked to derivative suit, which is very
important for both foreign investors and local investors. Derivative suit in Saudi
Arabia is very limited and difficult to pursue because under article 79 of Saudi
Companies Law derivative suits can be exercised only if the shareholder obtains
permission from the general assembly. If such permission is not obtained, the
shareholder may file a tort claim in his/her own name and at his/her own expense.
This is problematic because Saudi Arabia market is a concentrated ownership
market where family owned businesses are dominant.
In this research, I propose that the Saudi companies law should be amended
and remove the requirement for approval from the general assembly to file a
derivative suit in the case that the company does not use its right to file the suit.
Also, the courts should has the right to scrutinize the case to determine whether a
claim has merits or not before the shareholder proceed with the case. In addition,
shareholders who filed a derivative suit should recover costs so that the award of
damages were not strictly for the company.
I will support my arguments by analyzing existed published empirical
studies on minority shareholders protections and derivative suit. I hope that my
research will contribute to the scholarship of minority shareholders and derivative
suit.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Derivative Suit, Minority Shareholders’ Protection,
Saudi Arabia.

v

Table of Contents
Derivative Suit Under the Saudi Companies Law: Theory And Best Practice i
Chapter 1: ........................................................................................................ 1
Introduction to The Study................................................................................. 1
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study ........................................................................ 11
1.3 Research Questions ........................................................................................... 12
1.4 Research Methodology ..................................................................................... 12
1.5 Research Scope and Limitations ........................................................................ 14
1.6 Thesis Chapters ................................................................................................. 15
1.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 17

Chapter 2: ...................................................................................................... 19
Corporate Governance ................................................................................... 19
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 19
2.2 Definition of Corporate Governance ................................................................. 19
2.3 The Origins and Development of Corporate Governance ................................... 21
2.4 International Standards of Corporate Governance ............................................ 24
2.5 Theories of Corporate Governance .................................................................... 33
2.5.1 Agency Theory ................................................................................................ 33
2.5.2 Stewardship Theory ........................................................................................ 35
2.5.3 Stakeholder Theory......................................................................................... 37
2.5.4 Resource Dependency Theory ........................................................................ 40
2.5.5 Transaction Cost Theory ................................................................................. 42
2.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 44

Chapter 3: ...................................................................................................... 48
Minority Shareholders Under Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Laws and
Regulations .................................................................................................... 48
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 48
3.2 Saudi Corporate Governance Framework .......................................................... 49
3.2.1 Corporate Governance of Saudi Arabia ......................................................... 50
3.2.2 Ownership Structure in Saudi Arabia Stock Market ...................................... 59
3.3 Minority Shareholders Protections under the Saudi Legal System ...................... 66
3.4 Summary and Conclusion .................................................................................. 82

Chapter 4: ...................................................................................................... 84
Derivative Suit in Comparative Countries ....................................................... 84
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 84
4.2 Derivative Suit in the US .................................................................................... 85
4.3 Derivative Suit in Europe (UK, Germany, France) ............................................... 93
4.3.1 The UK ............................................................................................................. 93
4.3.2 Germany ....................................................................................................... 101

vi

4.3.3 France............................................................................................................ 103
4.4 Asia (Japan and China) .................................................................................... 107
4.4.1 China ............................................................................................................. 108
4.4.2 Japan ............................................................................................................. 111
4.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion ................................................................... 117

Chapter 5: .....................................................................................................119
Conclusion.....................................................................................................119
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 119
5.2 Summary ........................................................................................................ 119
5.3 Recommendations .......................................................................................... 127
5.4 Areas for Further Research .............................................................................. 130
5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion ................................................................... 131

Bibliography ..................................................................................................133

vii

Chapter 1:
Introduction to The Study
1.1 Introduction
Minority shareholder derivative action is quite common in developed countries and
has been adopted by emerging economies such as India and China.1 Saudi Arabia’s
company law has moved in this direction. However, there are differences and limitations.
Saudi Arabia’s company law recognizes the unfettered power of majority shareholders.2
However, minority shareholders are permitted to file a complaint against board of directors
on behalf of the company with limitations.3 Saudi Arabia’s company laws typically vest
power and rights in shareholders in ways that are consistent with their shareholding
capital.4 Minority shareholders have very limited voting rights and shareholder dividends
compared to majority shareholder. When the right to circumvent or prevent suspected
misbehaviour by directors of the company is factored, the degree of transparency and
accountability decreases because minority shareholders have little, to no incentives to
participate in the company. Therefore, it is not surprising when academics point out that
Saudi’s company law fails to equip minority shareholders with adequate protective rights.5

1

Ann M. Scarlett, Investors Beware: Assessing Shareholder Derivative Litigation in India and China, 33 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 173 (2011).
2
Khalid Saad Al-habshan, The Current Rights of Minority Shareholders in Saudi Arabia, 6(1)
INTERNATIONAL LAW RESEARCH, 185-204, 185 (2017).
3
Id. at 192.
4
Id. at 185.
5
Id. at 193.
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This thesis explores and describes the derivative suit under Saudi Arabia’s company
law and focuses on theory and best practices. This is an important area of study as Saudi
Arabia is one of the world’s largest players in the global oil market.6 Saudi Arabia
“produces more than a tenth of the world’s oil output” and “owns a quarter of the world’s
proven reserves.”7 Moreover, between 90% and 95% of revenue from exports in Saudi
Arabia are derived from oil.8 Still, Saudi Arabia realizes that economic growth and
development depends on foreign direct investment which in turn increases where returns
on investment opportunities are present.9 A diversified economy is more attractive to
foreign investors because it increases the opportunities for return on investments. Thus,
Saudi Arabia has been focused on diversification of its economy and attracting foreign
investors.10 Countries that provide strong shareholder protection are more likely to attract
foreign direct investors.11 Therefore, this study will provide insight into the strength and
weaknesses of Saudi Arabia’s shareholder protection laws and policies through derivative
suit.
Thus, a successful corporate governance model is expected to provide a strong
minority shareholders protections.12 Saudi Arabia, has been noted for its adoption of
international corporate governance standards. The main premise for corporate governance
regulations in Saudi Arabia is found in the latest Company Law statute and Corporate
6

Anton Nakov and Galo Nuno, Saudi Arabia and the Oil Market, December, THE ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 1332-1333, 1333 (2013).
7
Id.
8
Haga Elimam, Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia: A Review. 9(7)
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 222-227, 222 (2017).
9
Id. at 223.
10
Id.
11
Teresa L. Cyrus et al., Investor Protection and International Investment Positions: An Empirical Analysis.
9(2) INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, 197-222, 197 (2006).
12
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A survey of corporate governance. The Jounal OF Finance 52.2, 56
(1997).
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Governance Regulations.13 However, the implementation of laws and regulations do not
always provide sufficient protection of the rights of minority shareholders’ rights. Good
corporate governance regimes are not merely a collection of laws, regulations and codes.14
Rather, a good corporate governance regime also includes effective and efficient
enforcement mechanisms especially in developing and transitioning economies.15 While
Saudi Arabia may have adopted international standards of corporate governance, the
challenge is therefore determining the extent to which those standards are enforced and are
capable of protecting minority shareholders.
Even so, good corporate governance practices in other jurisdictions may influence
significant changes in the governance of firms in Saudi Arabia. Some good practices are
electronic voting, access to information for minority shareholders, derivative suit against
board abuses, and board independence.16 Any of these influences are limited in scope and
range due to the supremacy of Sharia law, values, principles and traditions in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. However, this research is concerned with derivative suit against board and
third party in the Saudi company. Derivative suits are important for both foreign investors
and local investors. The derivative suit is an extra and important layer of board oversight
which is entirely important in the financial market where calls for reforms have escalated
since the global financial crisis of 2008.17

13

Khalid Saad Al-Habshan, Issues Involving Corporate Transparency in the Saudi Capital Market, 6 (2)
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH, 21 (2017).
14
Erik Berglof & Stijn Claessens, Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries
and Transition Economies. 21(1) THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER, 123-150, 123 (2006).
15
Id.
16
Abdullah Alkhatani, The influence of corporate governance on protecting minority shareholders' rights in
the Saudi stock market: a comparative study. Diss. University of Westminster, 224 (2015).
17
Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis. 51 WILLIAM AND
MARY LAW REVIEW, 1749,1831, 1752 (2010).
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The link between shareholders, investment, and corporate governance is obvious.
Although, business, and political risks can discourage an investment prospect, legal risk
management can level the playing field.18 Thus, the protection of the rights of minority
shareholders is perceived as a means by which business and political risks can be mitigated.
Legal risk management would therefore include methods by which shareholders,
regardless of their ownership percentage may take action to circumvent or to be
compensated for directors’ mismanagement of assets particularly for personal reasons.19
Thus, the protection of the rights and privileges of minority shareholders paves the way for
improved corporate governance.
The protection of shareholders rights through the empowerment of minority
shareholders is known more commonly as a derivative suit. A derivative suit takes a
departure from the majority rule doctrine established in the case of Foss v. Harbottle. This
departure permits an exception to the majority rule doctrine by permitting members of a
company who are not pleased with the behaviour of directors who have brought about
injurious consequences to the company, can litigate claims against the directors for the
company.20
The concept of principal-agent relationship explains the derivative suit remedy for
minority shareholders. In such a scenario, the shareholders are the principal that is
responsible for appointing the board of directors to act as their agent. A principal-agent

18

Nadine Abi Chakra et al. Protecting Minority Investors: Achieving Sound Corporate Governance.
DOING BUSINESS, 65, (2017).
19
Id.
20
Yohana Gadaffi & Miriam Tatu, Derivative Action Under the Companies Act 2015: New Jurisprudence
or Mere Codification of Common Law Principles? 2(1) STRATHMORE LAW JOURNAL 75-96, 75
(2016).
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problem arises when the agent, faced with a conflict of interest is more included to pursue
personal interests rather than the interest and desires of the principal.21 This kind of a
problem increases the agency cost to the company.22 According to the theory of
representative shareholder suits developed by Thomas and Thompson, any form of
shareholder litigation serves as a method for managing agency costs.23 With the
empowerment of shareholders to litigate claims against directors and other agents, there is
tremendous and increasing pressure on agents to act in the interest of principals and
therefore, the company as a whole.24
Thus, Lan and Heracleous’ legal theory as a means of “rethinking” agency theory
offers a suitable understanding of the link between derivative claims and corporate
governance.25 To this end, Lan and Hercleous proposed the contractual/aggregate theory
which expounds upon agency theory. In this regard, the corporation is perceived as an
“artificial” person that is only defined by a contract between the members of the
corporation. 26 Thus, shareholder primacy and the members of the company’s obligation to
shareholders is the force behind the derivative suit. The shareholder primacy model is
inconsistent with and offers a challenge to the agency model which is aimed at a directors’
primacy model of governance.27
Under the director’s primacy model which prevails in agency theory, it is the duty

21

Ljiljana Maurovic & Tea Hasic, Reducing Agency Cost by Selecting an Appropriate System of Corporate
Governance, 26 ECONOMIC RESEARCH 225-242, 227 (2013).
22
Id.
23
Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and its
Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106(4) Northwestern University Law Review 1753, (2012).
24
Id.
25
Luh Luh Lan & Loizos Heracleous, Rethinking Agency Theory: The View from Law. 35(2) ACADEMY
OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 294 (2010).
26
Id. at 295.
27
Id.
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of the board as an agent, to file a suit on behalf of the company. When the agent fails in his
or her duty, shareholders may file a derivative suit on behalf of the company.28 The
derivative suit addresses the infringement of shareholder rights and deters misconduct.29 A
derivative suit is only as effective as its enforcement system. This enforcement system will
include a well-functioning court and objective regulators, together with incentives for
minority shareholders to file a suit.30 A system facilitating an efficient derivative suit
remedy has four factors. First, there is no minimum ownership threshold requirement for
the parties filing a suit. Secondly, there is a mechanism for minimizing or spreading
litigation risk to prevent rational apathy among minority shareholders. Thirdly, minority
shareholders have access to the information required by the suit. Finally, there is an
enforcement mechanism that allows minority shareholders to file a suit against directors
and even majority shareholders.31
State-owned enterprises and family run companies in specific in the Middle East
experience different sets of agency problems.32 Company law reforms in the Middle East,
which cover derivative suits against board members, are having an impact on private
firms.33 There is currently research gap on the impact of current reforms to Saudi corporate
law on corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders. Thus, this research
study narrows this gap by conducting a comparative study with developed countries’ legal

28

Hans Hirt, The enforcement of directors' duties in Britain and Germany: a comparative study with
particular reference to large companies. 121 (2004).
29
Wenjing Chen, A Comparative Study Of Funding Shareholder Litigation 15 (2017).
30
John Armour et al., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies And Enforcement 10 (2009).
31
Martin Gelter, Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?, 37 BROOK. J.
INT’L. L. 843-891, 856 (2012).
32
OECD, Towards New Arrangements For State Ownership In The Middle East And North Africa 61
(2012).
33
Alissa Amico, Corporate Governance For Competitiveness In The Middle East And North Africa 19
(2016).
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system.
Litigation by shareholders is often viewed as a means by which shareholders can be
compensated for a breach of their rights or any losses incurred due to the
company/directors’ negligence.34 This is however, a relatively recent development as
previously common law countries were strictly governed by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.35
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle maintains that the company is a distinct entity from its
members and as such, only the company is at liberty to take action for any “wrongdoing”
related to the company.36 The rigid restrictions against this rule made it difficult for
minority shareholders to pursue action for wrongs and breaches regarding their relationship
with the company.37 This is because the decision to file the derivative suit is controlled by
the majority shareholders.
Currently, company statutes internationally permit derivative actions. Derivative
actions allow minority shareholders or directors and perhaps creditors to initiate action for
the company against wrongdoers within the company or third parties who have harmed the
company.38 Theoretically, derivative action is intended to solve agency problems that arise
because those typically empowered to manage the company and take action on behalf of
the company have a conflict of interest.39 Derivative action is an important corporate
governance tool because it operates to force directors and managers to implement sound

34

Chen, supra note 29.
Michael St. Patrick Baxter, The Derivative Action Under the Ontario Business Corporations Act: A
Review of Section 97. 27 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL, 453-478, 453 (1982).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 454.
38
Yaad Rotem, The Law Applicable to Derivative Action on Behalf of a Foreign Corporation – Corporate
Law in Conflict, 46 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 321-360, 321 (2013).
39
Id.
35
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practices and policies and in turn foster transparency and accountability.40
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle and its exceptions are covered. This rule and the
exceptions giving rise to derivative claims by minority shareholders is applicable in
common law countries such as England, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and other
Common law jurisdictions. Although the use of the derivative claim varies from one
jurisdiction to another, most of the models appear to follow the UK model,41 as well as
Delaware models in the US.42 It will be noted and discussed in more details that the
derivative claim under the law of the United Kingdom is found under Section 260 of the
Companies Act 2006. Under Section 260, a minority shareholder is at liberty to commence
legal action on the grounds of negligence, default, breach of duty, or trust.43 Unfortunately,
under the UK law, derivative claims may only commence with the approval of the court.44
It is therefore hardly surprising that within the first five years of the statutory facilitation
of derivative claims only 16 suits were litigated.45
In the United States, a similar problem exists in that minority shareholders are
required to submit a request to the board of directors to sue the management or directors.46
However, if the shareholders aim to pursue a derivative claim against the entire board, the

40

James Kirbride et al., Minority Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Reflections on the Derivative
Action in the UK, the USA and in China, 51(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND
MANAGEMENT, 206-219, 206 (2009).
41
Frank Woolridge & Liam Davies, Derivative Claims under UK Company Law and Some Related
Provisions of German Law, 90 AMICUS CURAE 5-10, 5 (2012).
42
Meshal Faraj, Toward new corporate governance standards in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Lessons
from Delaware,150 (2014).
43
Companies Act 2006, section 260.
44
Woolridge & Davies, supra note 41.
45
Andrew Keay, The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties, 8, (2013). SSRN (June. 25, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201598.
46
Zhong Zhang, The Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why is the
Excitement Actually for Nothing?, 28 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 174-209, 186 (2011).
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need for approval is waived because the request will be futile because there is a conflict of
interest as we will explain latter in more details.47 In the European Union, derivative claims
are permissible although they are rare. For example, in Italy a claim is possible if the
individual holds 2.5% of the shares in the company.48 Whereas in Germany, only 1%
ownership is required.49
Japan’s derivative claims are more official than the approach taken in the US. A
derivative suit applies only to claims covered by the law. However, apart from this narrow
scope, there are no other significant limitations. A shareholder must first demand that the
corporation file an action against the director who has done wrong.50 If the company fails
to file a suit within 60 days after receiving the demand, then the shareholders may file a
derivative claim.51 There is no requirement for the shareholder to show wrongful refusal
on the part of the company in responding to the demand. After the elevation of the
derivative suit, the court cannot dismiss the claim based on the recommendation of the
company’s special litigation committee. To file a claim, the shareholder should own at least
a share for the last 6 months.52 It is easier to file a derivative suit in Japan and dismissal of
the suit is difficult.53
Derivative actions in China are facilitated by the Companies Law 2006. Pursuant
to Article 153, shareholders owning as little as 1% of a company’s shares are entitled to

47

Id. at 186.
Scott H. Mollett, Derivative Lawsuits Outside of Their Cultural Context: The Divergent Examples of
Italy and Japan, 43 U. S. F. L. REV. 635-670, 654 (2008-2009).
49
Gelter, supra note 31, at 858.
50
Hiroshi Oda, Shareholder’s Derivative Action in Japan, 8 E.C.F.R. 334, 341 (2011).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Gen Goto, Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 125164,139 (2014).
48
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file a derivative suit.54 However, only shareholders with at least 1% of shares for no less
than 180 consecutive days may file a derivative claim. The derivative action is a remedy
of last resort. An important issue with the initiation of a derivative suit is the cost involved
in official litigation.
However, article 79 of the New Saudi Companies Law provides for the derivative
claim on the part of minority shareholders. Pursuant to Article 79 and 80 a shareholder is
at liberty to submit a request to the general assembly for permission to file a lawsuit against
the relevant company’s directors. If the general assembly fails to take action, then the right
of the shareholder is limited to filing a direct lawsuit or a tort claim, under the name of the
shareholder and at his or her expense. This provision obviously functions more as a
discouragement rather than an incentive for pursuing a derivative claim.
The right to a civil lawsuit also has a limited incentive for shareholders with minority
holdings to pursue a derivative claim. For example, the civil lawsuit must include proof of
personal damages to the shareholders not the company. Moreover, the issue of causation is
pertinent. The shareholder pursuing the derivative claim must also prove that the alleged
damages were caused by the wrongful decision of the corporate directors. Complicating
the derivative suit, the shareholder must also prove that there was a relationship between
the damages and the wrongdoing of the corporate representatives. Proving the relationship
between personal damages and the wrongdoing of directors is very difficult, especially on
the part of small investors with limited knowledge, expertise, and money to seek legal
advice and representation to face a large company. However, the Saudi legal and regulatory

54

Scarlett, supra note 1, at 220.
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framework does not exclude the derivative suit, the new Saudi Companies Law provides a
remedy that seems similar to the derivative suit in some ways but not in other ways.55 Thus,
compared to the derivative claim in developed countries, Saudi Arabia takes a very narrow
approach to challenges to directors’ recklessness that causes damages to the company. As
will be demonstrated in this thesis, any anti-director claim under Saudi Arabia’s current
law requires that shareholders obtain the approval of the General Assembly, otherwise,
minority shareholders’ right is limited to a direct suit. Therefore, this research study
narrows this gap by carrying a comparative, descriptive and exploratory study using a black
letter legal studies approach.

1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study
The aim of the study is to determine the extent to which Saudi Arabia’s current legal
and regulatory framework provides protection for minority shareholders through the
remedy of the derivative suit. To achieve the aim of this study, the following objectives are
pursued:
1. To gain an understanding of Saudi Arabia’s legal and regulatory framework for the
protection of minority shareholders;
2. To determine whether Saudi Arabia’s existing legal and regulatory framework
makes provision for the remedy of derivative action for minority shareholders;
3. To gain insight into how Saudi Arabia’s derivative suit remedy compares to other
jurisdictions;

55

Mohammed Albrahim, The enforcement of directors' duties in the context of shareholders' rights
protection: a comparative study between UK and Saudi law. Diss. Lancaster University, 197 (2016).
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4. To ascertain the extent to which the adoption of the derivative suit in Saudi Arabia
aligns with the operation of this remedy in other jurisdictions; and
5. To identify areas for improving the protection of minority shareholders via the
derivative suit in Saudi Arabia.

1.3 Research Questions
In order to achieve the aim and objectives of this study, the following research
questions were composed:
1. How effective are Saudi Arabia’s new Companies Law and Corporate Governance
Regulations relative to the protection of the rights of minority shareholders?
2. How well do the new Companies Law and Corporate Governance Regulations in
Saudi Arabia make provision for the derivative suit as a remedy for minority
shareholders?
3. How does the protection of minority shareholders through the derivative suit in
Saudi Arabia compare to the treatment of minority shareholders in other
jurisdictions?
4. How well does the new Companies Law and Corporate Governance Regulations in
Saudi Arabia recognize the derivative suit remedy as it works in other jurisdictions?
5. What are the improvements to the new Companies Law and Corporate Governance
Regulations in Saudi Arabia that can enhance the protection of minority
shareholders via the derivative suit remedy?

1.4 Research Methodology
The research is carried out using the black letter approach to legal studies. The black
12

letter approach to legal studies believes that research inquiries about a legal issue or any
subject in legal studies can be found in the literature: law/statutes, cases and scholarly
articles.56 Basically, the black letter approach takes the position that the law is neutral and
seeks to explain its interpretation and application by looking toward the written texts on
the legal issue or law under investigation.57 In other words, the black letter approach is
simply a research methodology based on the belief that the answer to legal research
questions can be found “in books”.58
The research is not literally confined to books per se. In compliance with what might
be expected of black letter legal research, this study will collect data from both primary
and secondary sources. The primary sources consist of the provisions of the old and new
Saudi Companies Law, Saudi Corporate Governance laws and regulations, together with
tort law and Sharia rules. For comparative analyses, other primary sources will consist of
the laws and regulations applicable to other jurisdictions. The secondary sources collected
and analysed in this study are comprised of journal articles, text books and papers published
in books, journals, magazines, newspapers, and/or websites. The secondary sources consist
of material and content that are pertinent to the protection of minority shareholders through
the derivative suit in Saudi Arabia and in other jurisdictions.
The study utilizes a comparative method by comparing minority shareholder
protection before and after the new Saudi Companies Law. The study will also compare
the extent of adoption of the derivative suit in Saudi Arabia to that of other jurisdictions.

56

Shazia Qureshi, Research Methodology in Law and its Application to Women’s Human Rights Law,
22(2) JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES, 629-643, 632 (2015).
57
Id.
58
Id.
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In addition, critical analysis will also be a methodology of the study. The study will identify
the strengths and weaknesses of the existing legal and regulatory framework for the
protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Specific focus will be on the areas for
improvement in protecting minority shareholders through the derivative suit. The study
will draw on best practices for the efficient and effective operation of the derivative suit as
a remedy for minority shareholders in different jurisdictions and will determine how these
methods can improve the use of derivative suits by minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia.

1.5 Research Scope and Limitations
The limitations of this research are related to the collection of empirical data. The
time and expense involved in the collection of empirical data from Saudi Arabian
companies are beyond the time and expense at the disposal of the researcher. Therefore,
this study is limited to the collection and analysis of archived data. Although this research
is limited in terms of its exclusion of empirical data, this limitation is compensated for, by
the use of updated, available secondary data which is regarded as primary data collected
by another researcher. As a legal research paper, empirical data is not necessary, as primary
data in terms of cases and statutes provides the basis of the analytical approaches.
Therefore, the limitation of this study in terms of empirical data does not impact the
credibility and reliability of research findings.
The scope of this study is broad although its central focus is narrowed down to
derivative claims and the Saudi law. The broad scope arises out of the fact that two laws
are considered under Saudi law: the old Companies law, and the current companies law. In
addition, the research scope broadens to include other jurisdictions for comparative
analyses. The jurisdictions considered are broad and include the United Kingdom, the
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United States, Japan, European countries and China. However, in order to shed light on the
weaknesses and strengths of Saudi Arabia’s derivative claim remedies it is necessary to
compare its current law with its past laws and with the laws of other jurisdictions. Once
the weaknesses and strengths are identified, recommendations can only be made if they are
compared to and measured against the principles, values, laws and standards of Sharia law.
This is because, Saudi Arabia is expressly an Islamic state and its laws are all secondary to
the Sharia law. In other words, the implementation of changes to the current Company law
for the improvement of derivative claims is only possible if they are consistent with the
Sharia law.

1.6 Thesis Chapters
This study will be organized and presented in five chapters. The first chapter presents
a background to the need for derivative suits generally and its importance to Saudi Arabia.
In the process, the definition and concept of derivative suits are explained. The background
information will also provide an understanding of the applicable legal landscape in Saudi
Arabia. In addition, this chapter will also provide the aim and objectives of the study as
well as the research questions. The research methodology and a generalized review of
literature on derivative suit remedies and corporate governance are provided in the
introductory chapter. The study’s organization, research scope and limitations are also
provided.
Chapter Two of this thesis provides an introduction to corporate governance. This
chapter starts with the definition of corporate governance. After that the international
standards of corporate governance is discussed. This chapter will end with the discussion

15

of corporate governance theory.
Chapter Three discusses Corporate Governance and Minority Shareholder Protection
Under Saudi Arabia’s Legal System. This chapter also discuss minority shareholders
protections under the new Saudi Companies Law which came into effect in 2016. Chapter
Three will also deal with the derivative suit remedy under Saudi Companies law.
Chapter Four of this research study covers Derivative Suit in Other Jurisdictions.
This chapter looks to each of these comparative sources such as the United States, the
European Union, China, and Japan and will be covered as a means of identifying areas for
improving the derivative claim under Saudi Arabia’s law.
Chapter Five of this thesis is entitled: Conclusion and Recommendations. In this
chapter the researcher provides a summary of the research issues investigated. This will
include a view of the aim and objectives, and the research questions. The conclusion will
set out how each of the research questions were answered and the research findings will be
delineated. These findings are discussed in terms of consequences for further research and
practice. In this regard, the conclusion and recommendations chapter will identify
weaknesses and strengths in the derivative claim remedy under Saudi Arabia’s current
laws.
The researcher’s concluding remarks will therefore contemplate what actions Saudi
Arabia’s lawmakers can take to strengthen the derivative claim remedy and in turn,
improve corporate governance in the Saudi Arabia. In reviewing the research findings, the
researcher will also identify areas for further research. In doing so, areas for further
research will be delineated in this final chapter of the thesis.
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1.7 Conclusion
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This chapter introduced the topic of this research study and in doing so provided a rationale
for the thesis. In general, this study was rationalized on the basis of the importance of
foreign direct investment to the economic growth and development of Saudi Arabia.
Foreign investors are only likely to invest in a country’s infrastructure and economy if their
rights and assets are protected. To this end, the right to launch derivative claims are very
important. In addition to rationalizing this research study topic, this chapter also provided
background information on the definition and concepts of derivative claims. The aim and
objectives of this research together with the research questions were also provided. The
aim and objectives, together with the research questions placed this study into the realm of
Saudi Arabia’s Companies laws of the past and the present. This was necessary for
establishing that although other jurisdictions are considered, they are only studied for
comparative purposes.
This chapter therefore established that the thesis is focused on derivative claims in
Saudi Arabia. The introduction promises to uncover the strengths and weaknesses of
derivative claims under Saudi laws by reference to the laws of other jurisdictions with a
view to making recommendations for improving Saudi laws for facilitating derivative
claims.
This chapter also sets out a general review of the literature with a view to identifying
what derivative claims are and how they are governed in general and especially in Saudi
Arabia. The organization of this study was also presented. In addition, this introductory
chapter described the research methodology and how the study will be organized. Each
chapter is previewed peripherally so that the reader knows what to expect in the ensuing
pages of this thesis.
18

Chapter 2:
Corporate Governance
2.1 Introduction
This thesis involves the study of derivative suit under Saudi Arabia’s company law and
focuses on theory and best practice. Derivative suit is essentially a method by which the
rights of shareholders are protected. Since the protection of shareholder’s rights is an
important part of corporate governance, this chapter is an introduction to corporate
governance and includes its definition, its origins and development, international standards
and corporate governance theory.

2.2 Definition of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is not strictly defined and as such, there are several definitions
of the term in the literature.59 Broadly speaking, the term corporate governance is a
framework adopted by corporations for structuring the methods, policies, rules and systems
for directing how the corporation will carry out its business, treat its members, how
operations will be administered and controlled.60
According to Blair, corporate governance is an entire “set of legal, cultural, and
institutional arrangements that” ascertain what a company “can do, who controls,” it, how
control is carried out, and how “the risks and returns from the activities” a company
undertakes “are allocated”.61 More narrowly, corporate governance is term used to describe
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how the board of directors, managers and shareholders duties and rights are designed.
Ultimately, the focus on the duties of boards and management are calculated to serve the
interest of shareholders.62
According to Mason and O’Mahony, the most popular definition of corporate
governance is the one offered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).63 The OECD’s definition of corporate governance was introduced
in 1999 and subsequently amended in 2004. The OECD’s definition of corporate
governance is:
A set of relationships between a company’s management, its board,
its shareholders and other stakeholders [that] provides the structure
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are
determined.64
The OECD’s definition of corporate governance has been indorsed by several large
international and national organizations including the World Bank, the European
Commission and the UK’s Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.65
Essentially, the OECD’s definition of corporate governance refers to a compilation of
directions for effective and efficient business objectives and relations.66
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2.3 The Origins and Development of Corporate Governance
While corporate governance can be traced back to the 1930s, the term as it is used today
was not introduced until the 1970s.67 Therefore, the term corporate governance is a
relatively new area of research and practice. It is therefore, hardly surprising, that since it’s
introduction, it remains a controversial subject as academics and policy makers, together
with corporations appear to have difficulty agreeing on what constitutes appropriate
corporate governance.68 The only undisputed issue is that corporations require corporate
governance constructs in order to prevent corporate failure and to protect the interests of
shareholders and other stakeholders.
The introduction of the agency theory framework for corporate governance in 1976 is
credited with the commencement of research in corporate governance.69By the 1990s,
corporate governance was well-documented in the literature and as a method of regulating
and constructing businesses all over the world. Today, corporate governance is a framework
studied and debated by researchers, and used by regulatory bodies, companies and
investors worldwide.70
From about the decade of the 1980s, the term corporate governance began to
heighten interest and awareness due to the economic and political reforms advocated by
the OECD.71 In addition, corporate scandals globally drew attention to the vulnerability of
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corporate and individual greed which created conflicts of interests and eventual corporate
collapses.72 Scandals had a negative impact on the public’s confidence in corporations.
Investors also lost confidence in corporations.73 The renewed and more intense focus on
corporate governance was intended to improve investor and public confidence in
corporations.
US corporate scandals in companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth
and European scandals in Parmalat, Royal Ahod and Vivendi Universal and scandals
elsewhere drew attention to whether corporate governance was a means by which to
prevent corporate misconduct.74 The idea of focusing primarily on a corporate governance
framework that worked out the legal issues and obligations of the firm was mute. It was
time to emphasize the opportunities for fraud, theft, “abuse of power” and “social
responsibility.”75
As Grant points out, corporate governance was inevitable because history shows a
pattern of corporate mismanagement which rebounds to society.76 Governments have been
perpetually charged with the responsibility for rescuing failed companies and preventing
failures through the introduction of regulatory frameworks. In the meantime, investors are
constantly confronting the preservation of portfolios and assets and carefully choose
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companies where these items may be held. Still, corporate governance “remains the core
issue in these battles”.77
Research carried out by Anderson, Melanson and Maly between the years 20042005 shows that the underlying premise of corporate governance in modern corporations
is the monitoring and accountability of management.78 In the study carried out by
Anderson, et al., it was discovered that corporations in the US, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand were shifting away from Agency directed corporate governance and were
increasingly moving in the direction of a stewardship model of corporate governance.79
As will be discussed at the end of this chapter, an agency model would focus on the
installation of a board as monitors of company executives and managers. A stewardship
model would be more inclined to allocate monitoring duties to investors and form
partnerships with executives and managers in the management of the corporation.
Regardless of the framework, corporate governance establishes boundaries for
management and in the meantime, provides a means by which management are accountable
to stakeholders, especially shareholders.
In another more recent study, Schymik found that corporate governance by
international companies have taken a different and more surprising turn.80 The study found
that companies in sectors that have market liberalization in the global market have altered
their corporate governance frameworks so that their managers have greater autonomy and
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receive increased wages. However, these practices are prevalent in sectors “that are
characterized by large exit rates”.81

2.4 International Standards of Corporate Governance
Jaimes-Valdez, Jacobo-Hernandez and Ochoa-Jimenez reports that worldwide,
trends in the corporate governance models contained in legislative provisions have
changed.82 Essentially, legal codes were typically modelled after the insider and
outsider/shareholder standards. The insider and outsider shareholder models of corporate
governance focuses on shareholder primacy. The insider corporation is typically owned by
shareholders with large shareholding to a point where minority shareholders have scant
protection.83 However, these models are finding themselves on a path toward replacement
with the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. The primary emphasis of the
Anglo-American model is “democracy, transparency and accountability”.84
Still, the Anglo-American model of corporate governance is also shareholder
oriented and falls under the outsider model where the protection of minority shareholders
is more defined than the insider model.85 What distinguishes the UK model of corporate
governance from the US model is that compliance with corporate governance standards is
voluntary in the UK. In the UK, companies are expected to comply with established

81

Id.
Jaimes-Valdez, supra note 74.
83
Roger Barker, Insiders, Outsiders, and Change in European Corporate Governance. PAPER
PRESENTED AT THE COUNCIL FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES CONFERENCE, Chicago. 31 March
2006. 5 (2 August 2018, 8.39 p.m.). http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/files/Papers/Barker.pdf
84
Jaimes-Valdez, supra note 74.
85
Andrew Mullinex, Is There an Anglo-American Corporate Governance Model? 7 (4) INTERNATIOAL
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 437-338, 437 (2010).
82

24

corporate governance provisions or explain. In the US, corporate governance is more
strictly defined and is therefore described as “rules-based”.86
The Anglo-American model of corporate governance is typically “one-tiered” in
that it is comprised of a Board of Directors usually consisting of directors that do not hold
executive positions and have been elected by the company’s shareholders.87 Although
uncommon, some Anglo-American governed companies do form boards of directors
consisting of executives.88
The European model of corporate governance which falls under the outsider model
is not solely committed to the interests of shareholders. Stakeholders are also important.
Europe follows Germany’s stakeholder framework of corporate governance.89 Under the
stakeholder model of corporate governance companies are not merely devoted to the
maximization of shareholder’s wealth. Instead, companies are also concerned about the
“interests and well-being of those who can assist or hinder the achievements of
organization’s objective.”90 What this means is that the European model of corporate
governance seeks to take account of the interests of a broader group of stakeholders which
include shareholders.91 The main stakeholders are employees, suppliers, consumers,
members of the community and shareholders.92
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Although the European Commission established a framework for regulating
companies law across Europe, there is much debate over whether European can implement
a standardized corporate governance regime.93 During the 1990s, many companies adopted
corporate governance models fashioned after the Anglo-American approach.94 However,
by the year 2000, companies worldwide began adopting the European Model and in fact,
there is a degree of convergence between the European and Anglo-American models of
corporate governance.95
Both the Anglo-American and European models of corporate governance have been
described as representative of international standards of corporate governance.96 Countries
seeking to adopt international standards of corporate governance will generally implement
the Anglo-American or the European Model or a mixture of the two models.97
The most current international corporate governance framework is the G20/OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015. The 2015 Principles area spin off from the
OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles of 1999 and 2004.98 The 2015 Principles were
the result of a combined effort by G20 countries in response to the global financial crisis
of 2007-2008. Obviously, the previous international standards of corporate governance
were inadequate. As Tamaki puts it “When most needed, existing standards failed to
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provide the checks and balances that companies needed in order to cultivate sound business
practices.”99
G20 participants and the OECD came to the conclusion that previous corporate
governance models failed to adequately provide safeguards against poor risk management,
excessive remuneration, poor board practices and inefficient protection of the rights of
shareholders.100 The amendment to the OECD’s 2004 Corporate Governance Principles
therefore focused on the areas of risk management, remuneration, board practices and the
protection of shareholder’s rights.101
The G20/OECD Corporate Governance Principles is divided into six chapters. The
first chapter establishes that corporate governance is important for establishing and
maintaining markets that are fair and transparent while facilitating the “efficient allocation
of resources”.102 The next five chapters contain five principles of corporate governance.
The five principles are: the protection of shareholders’ rights and their duties; the fiduciary
impact of investor, stock markets and other like parties with an emphasis on the importance
of accurate reporting and avoiding a conflict of interest; the significance of stakeholders;
transparency and reporting; and the duties of the board.103
The first principle titled “the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key
ownership functions”104 establishes that shareholders enjoy the right to participate in the
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company which typically includes attending meetings and voting.105Ownership through
shareholding conveys income and liabilities commensurate with the amount of shares held
by the shareholder. Of significance is the fact that shareholders should always have
confidence that their interest in the company is protected and if they are not happy with the
decisions made by management, they are able to challenge those decisions.106 Thus,
derivative action should be an inalienable right for shareholders and is among the main
principles of corporate governance in international standards for an effective and efficient
framework.
This principle also emphasizes that different jurisdictions should install some
restrictions on shareholders’ right to seek legal remedies against management to avoid
abuse of the process. Some of these restrictions would include tests for determining
whether directors went outside the requirement for acting on the basis of the good judgment
rule or avoiding a conflict of interest.107 The shareholder principle establishes the basic
rights of shareholders which include the right to register shares, transfer shares, access to
information “on a timely and regular basis”; the right to “participate and vote in general
shareholder meetings”; the right to “elect and remove members of the board”; and the right
to profits.108
Other shareholder rights include the right to be adequately informed of decisions
that fundamentally change the company, statutory and articles changes, the right to
authorize “additional shares” and the right to be informed of unusual activities inclusive of
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asset changes that essentially lead to the “sale of the company”.109 Moreover, shareholders:
“…should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, including questions relating
to the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to
propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations.”110
Shareholders should also have the right to participate in the important corporate
governance decision-making including nominating members of the board and subsequent
elections. In addition, all shareholders should be treated the same way and any capital
incentives for improving shareholders’ influence should be published and open for
inspection. More importantly, minority shareholders should have protected rights in
relation to abuse by majority shareholders and “should have effective means of redress”.111
Minority shareholders can and should be protected through disclosure and by a
neutral board that focuses on the company’s interest as opposed to the interest of the
majority shareholders. Derivative suit is listed as one method of protecting the rights of
minority shareholders.112 The remaining principles are not directly related to derivative
claims but together create a basis for establishing and maintaining ethical and fair standards
for the management of the company and its relationship with members of the company.
These regulations may come across as soft law, but the implementation of these principles
establishes a “co-regulatory” framework for putting constraints on directors and
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management, while protecting the rights of minority shareholders and all other
stakeholders of the company.113
Further protection of shareholder rights are contained in the second principle of the
G20/OECD Principles of 2015. Specifically, the second principle zeroes in on institutional
investors who act as fiduciaries of the company and insist that they disclose how they deal
with conflicts of interests that impact ownership rights relative to their investments.114
Obviously, institutional investors have shareholding in more than one company and more
often they hold significant shares in each company. There is bound to be a conflict of
interest and while disclosure of how they manage these conflicts is important, the right to
derivative claims by minority shareholders is also important for putting pressure on
institutional investors to properly manage their conflicts of interest.
The third principle of the G20/OCED Principles of 2015 deals with corporate social
responsibility in the context of stakeholders. This principle calls upon companies to respect
rights of stakeholders that are usually established through law and/or contract.115 Labor
laws, commercial laws, environmental laws and insolvency laws are some of the laws that
establish the rights of stakeholders. Other stakeholder rights such as the rights of suppliers
are established by contract.116 Shareholders are stakeholders and this principle therefore
adds an additional rung to the protection of minority shareholder rights. Specifically, the
third principle provides that:
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Stakeholders, including employees and their representative bodies,
should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or
unethical practices to the board and to the competent public
authorities and their rights should not be compromised for doing
this.117
As pointed out by the G20/OECD Principles of 2015, when officers of a corporation behave
in unethical or illegal ways on behalf of the company, they not only have implications for
stakeholder rights, but also for the company as a whole. The reputational damages can have
long-term effects to the detriment of all stakeholders including shareholders. Shareholders
are bound to have a greater degree of concern as they will likely confront economic
liabilities well into the future.118 Therefore, the right to derivative claims is very important
for containing and preventing unethical and illegal behavior of directors and other officers
of the company.
The fourth principle of the G20/OECD Principles of 2015 deal with transparency
and disclosure. This principle requires that a good corporate governance regime ensures
that authentic disclosure is published detailing all important issues in relation to the
company. This kind of disclosure will include the financial and non-financial matters
including “performance, ownership and governance of the company”.119 While this duty is
not directly related to derivative claims, it does provide an indirect method for safeguarding
the rights of all stakeholders. The duty for transparency and disclosure ensures that the
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company considers the rights and interests of all stakeholders and behaves in ethical and
legal ways.
The final principle is very important for the enforcement and protection of minority
shareholder rights. The final principle of the G20/OECD Principles, 2015 provides that:
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by
the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the
shareholders.120
Strengthening the oversight and accountability parameters of this final principle of
corporate governance, is the further provision that boards act with adequate information,
and “in good faith, with due diligence and care” as well as in the “best interest of the
company and the shareholders”.121
The right to participate in the election and removal of board members is therefore
very important to minority shareholders. The fact that minority shareholders and all
shareholders have a right to replace a board of directors or any member of the board should
put significant pressure on boards to act in the interest of the company and all of its
shareholders.
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2.5 Theories of Corporate Governance
The main theories contributing to the development of corporate governance are
agency, stewardship, stakeholder, resource dependency and transaction cost economics
theories.122 This section of the chapter examines agency, stewardship, stakeholder, resource
dependency and transaction cost economic theories. Each theory will be examined within
the context of corporate governance.
2.5.1 Agency Theory

The underlying premise of agency theory in the context of corporate governance is
that managers/agents are required to act in the best interest of the shareholders/owners of
the corporation.123Essentially, agency theory centers on the problems and risks associated
with agencies and the prospects of resolving those problems.124 At the heart of agency
theory is the possible problems that will arise through the separation of ownership/principal
from management/agent. Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms constructed on
agency theory will be aimed at identifying, preventing and dealing with agency
problems.125
Agency theory dictates that owners/shareholders/principals of a corporation
transfer authority for the running of the company to directors and management who in turn
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undertake to run the business for the benefit of the shareholders.126 In doing so, there is a
risk that management might take advantage of opportunities for self-enrichment or may
fail in general or in egregious ways to safeguard the interest of shareholders. Obviously,
ethical and legal obligations within a corporate governance framework is designed to
safeguard against these kinds of infractions. Moreover, a corporate governance framework
that requires transparency and disclosure should function to minimize or eliminate the risk
of agency problems.
A corporate governance framework that emphasizes the rights of shareholders,
including the minority shareholders’ right to derivative claims provides for some measure
of protection against agency problems. The main outcome of agency theory in the context
of corporate governance is the implementation of a corporate board of directors. The board
of directors in this case are charged with the responsibility for monitoring management.127
Thus, agency theory seeks to resolve the agency problem through corporate governance by
maintaining a system of checks and balances and ensuring that the business goals are
consistent with the interest of shareholders.128
In other words, a corporate governance framework centered around agency theory
focuses on the rights and interest of shareholders and will seek to distribute and protect the
rights of shareholders. Minority shareholders are more at risk of exploitation by agents of
the company since they are less likely to participate in the company. As a result, the
supervision of managing directors, the accountability and transparency parameters are all
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methods by which remote shareholders can rely on for protecting their interests and rights
in the company.
2.5.2 Stewardship Theory

Over the past two decades, the theory of stewardship has been proposed as an
alternative to agency theory in the construction of corporate governance frameworks.129
Still there are similarities between agency and stewardship theories. Both theories attempt
to ascertain the “role and behavior of directors” in the acquisition of the company’s
objectives.130 Both agency and stewardship theories also accept that agency situations do
arise in the environment of companies. Stewardship theory differs in that it is argued that:
…agents/directors who act as stewards will not be concerned about
fostering their own economic interests, but will want to act in the best
interests of their company and they will act in a way that leads to
collectivist/organization utility rather than self-serving benefits, and
in working towards organizational ends their personal needs are
fulfilled.131
Conventional wisdom dictates that if as suggested by stewardship theory, directors
are essentially loyal to the company and its members, there is no real need for board
oversight.132 The suggestion is that due to the high level of trust between the company and
directors, boards are unnecessary is tantamount to overlooking the fact that boards are a
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commonplace unit in all modern corporations.133 Moreover, board oversight of directors is
more concerned with the level of trust between directors and the company itself. Minority
shareholders will typically have to trust directors to act in their interests without the
opportunity to determine whether or not the directors selected for the company can be
trusted.
The theory of stewardship relies on directors and managers acting as stewards.
Stewards are individuals within a corporate setting that protect and maximize shareholder
value by focusing on the performance of the company.134 Stewardship theory argues that
managers and directors are hired for taking care of the operations of the company at a high
level and their accomplishments are measured in terms of the company’s performance. As
a result, managers and directors’ main goal is maximization of corporate value.135
Stewardship theorists therefore assume that the steward manager or director does
not separate his or her objectives from the objectives of the firm. Stewardship theorists
believe that hard work, autonomy and self-reliance are significant motivational factors for
managers in terms of the achievement of organizational objectives. Managers and directors
perform at high levels when they are trusted to do so.136 Moreover, with the company’s
performance as their primary objective and motivation, managers and directors maximize
shareholder value by placing an emphasis of firm performance.137
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It appears to be unrealistic to trust directors and managers to serve as stewards of
companies especially with the scandals over the years indicating that management can have
interest that are inconsistent with the interests of shareholders. This is the premise of
agency theory and speaks to its popularity as a corporate governance framework.138
Stewardship theory leaves too much authority in the hands of directors and managers so
that minority shareholders are less likely to have the legal protection they might have under
an agency theory of corporate governance where directors and managers are accountable.
2.5.3 Stakeholder Theory

The stakeholder theory of corporate governance emphasizes the all-inclusive rights
and interests of stakeholders and thus promotes the idea of corporate social
responsibility.139 Stakeholder theory departs from share maximization constructs
underlying agency theory and in turn, the Anglo-American model of corporate governance.
Instead of emphasizing the company’s commitment to shareholder value, the stakeholder
theory broadens the company’s commitment to include a variety of individuals and groups
with an interest or connection to the company. This wider group is referred to as
stakeholders.140
Stakeholder theorists believe that a company’s value and risks emanate from a
broad array of interests groups and individuals. Therefore, focusing purely on shareholder
value is bound to lead to the problems associated with scandals that occurred under the
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Anglo-American model of corporate governance.141 To begin with, employees have a
significant impact on the company’s performance and to overlook their interests will not
serve the objective of shareholder maximization well.
Focusing solely on the interest of shareholders is misguided because shareholders
can always leave the company by selling or transferring their shares elsewhere. In the
meantime, employees have a far more difficult time moving on to another corporation or
job.142 Moreover, arguably, the skills, knowledge and performance that employees bring
into a company are worth far more than the combined capital of shareholders.143 Similar
arguments can be made in favor of other stakeholders including, consumers. It is quite
obvious that when consumers take their business elsewhere, the firm suffers tremendous
damages.
The loss of suppliers and community support can also damage the reputation of the
firm to the point where shareholder value suffers damages. Therefore, the idea of corporate
social responsibility is very important within the ambit of the stakeholder theory of
corporate governance. It is therefore hardly surprising that the stakeholder theory of
corporate governance is regarded as a stark departure from the shareholder maximization
model of corporate governance. Rather than focusing on the protection and promotion of
shareholder value, the stakeholder theory of corporate governance includes the duty to also
look after the interests of a wider group of stakeholders including suppliers, communities,
employees and a number of other interest groups.144
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Thus, stakeholder theory promotes the idea of corporate social responsibility which
promises to improve corporate performance. A study carried out by Choongo showed that
although the reputation of the firm and the level of commitment by employees had minimal
impact on company performance, CSR was found to have a significant impact on economic
performance.145
Essentially, stakeholder theory encourages the implementation of a corporate
governance framework that adheres to corporate social responsibility constructs. As a
result, the company is expected to take account of the interests of a variety of stakeholders.
For example, the community will be concerned about environmental damages from the
operations carried on by the company. Therefore, an environmentally friendly program to
protect the community will be engineered under the corporate governance framework.
Similarly, a corporate governance framework incorporating corporate social
responsibility will ensure that consumers’ interest is dealt with in a positive way.
Employees will also work in good conditions and will not be subjected to human rights
abuses. The organization will also become engaged in charitable causes. Ultimately, the
corporate social responsibility model encompassed by the stakeholder theory of corporate
governance aims to establish ethical and legal standards for the governance of the company.
These standards are expected to include democratic institutions such as fairness,
transparency and accountability. Therefore, at the end of the day, a company guided by the
stakeholder theory of the firm is expected to incorporate a corporate governance framework
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that eventually leads to shareholder maximization through a build-up of a respected and
admired reputation as the company comes across as model corporate citizen.
It is expected that when a firm constructs a corporate governance framework guided
by the stakeholder theory, derivative suit is a well-protected and supported remedy. This is
because the stakeholder framework promotes corporate social responsibility where the
interest of all groups whether they are civil rights groups or shareholders are taken into
account. In the circumstances it is entirely unlikely that derivative action would be denied
minority shareholders who are just as important to the company as majority shareholders
within the reasoning of stakeholder theory.
2.5.4 Resource Dependency Theory

Resource dependency theory argues that external forces have an impact on the
company’s behavior and while managers may be restricted in their decisions, they are in a
position to “reduce environmental uncertainty and dependence”.146 Power sits at the core
of this concept of resource dependence. Companies seek to take a dual approach to power.
First. they attempt to increase their power over external elements. Secondly, companies
attempt to reduce the power that external elements have over them.147
Essentially, resource dependency theory argues that companies do not exist in a
vacuum. In reality, companies are a part of a system that includes a number of
interconnected and interdependent elements. At the same time, there is a significant degree
of uncertainty and unpredictability regarding what the other elements might or might not
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do. As a result, “survival and continued success” is unpredictable and uncertain.148 As a
result, companies set out plans that are designed to control external interdependencies
despite the lack of success and the production of renewed interdependencies and
dependencies. In fact, “these patterns of dependence produce interorganizational as well as
intra-organizational power, where such power has some effect on organizational
behavior.”149
Given the uncertainty of survival and success, company management are under
significant pressure to keep up with the external elements impacting the business. This
pressure is heightened because shareholders might be minded to remove and replace the
board of directors and this has an impact on corporate governance inside the company.150
Regardless, according to the resource dependency theory, the basis of power within
the organization is founded on specific standards that are unique to the company in
question. Therefore, it is imperative that the organization establish a set of regulations and
principles that would distinguish the organization from others.151 Power originates within
the company and is evidenced by budgets and the allocation of the company’s resources.152
Thus, a corporate governance structure that ensures that the company manages its
resources properly and effectively for efficient outcomes will establish standards for
management behavior. A corporate governance system under the theory of resource
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dependency will likely be very similar to the Anglo-American model which is modeled
after the agency theory since pressure is on management to perform ethically, and
competently. However, resource dependency models of corporate governance depends on
indirect responsibilities to shareholders.
The emphasis is on the management’s relationship with the company and the
responsibilities that come with that relationship. As a result, it is expected that shareholders
will benefit from this indirect relationship. Agency theory does not take this risk and
immediately and urgently places responsibility on the management team for protecting the
rights and interests of all shareholders. When the G20/OECD Corporate Governance
Principles of 2015 are added to the discussion on agency theory, it becomes clear that the
agency risks can be reduces more appropriately with an agency theory approach over a
resource dependency approach to corporate governance.
2.5.5 Transaction Cost Theory

Transaction costs theory takes the position that the company is entrenched in a
dynamic environment and as such it is submerged in a multi-layered system. There are
three degrees that are linked to the company’s existence: market and environment which is
just a level above the company, production and people at a level below the firm. Yet,
transactions costs are the fundamental methods for evaluating the company. For the most
part, the transaction cost theory focuses on assessing a company’s success on the basis of
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its costs and profits. This indicates that the bigger and more successful a firm is evidenced
by its bottom line.153
It is therefore hardly surprising that transaction cost theory was first broached
where the decision was discussed whether to carry out a transaction within the firm or to
outsource.154 Essentially, transaction cost theory argues that a company will decided
between two options for the acquisition of resource control. One option is to decide how
ownership will come about. This could occur through a hierarchal remedy including
“decisions over production, supply and the purchases of inputs”.155 The other option is the
purchase of the assets which is a market remedy. This remedy involves “individuals and
firms” making “independent decisions that are guided and coordinated by market
prices”.156
When a decision is made, it is based on an analysis of the transaction costs of the
market remedy and hierarchal remedy. Obviously whichever remedy cost less for the firm
and benefits the firm more will be the remedy selected. For example, “high transaction
costs for outsourcing may suggest an in-house solution whereas low transaction costs for
outsourcing would support the argument to outsource”.157
Transaction cost theory does not focus on the relationship between management
and shareholders/owners in the composition of a corporate governance system and
framework. The main focus of a transaction cost theory of corporate governance would be
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the means by which a firm’s transactions costs are minimized. This would obviously
require the hiring and maintenance of competent, ethical and efficient management team.
Therefore, the corporate governance structure would include all the fundamental
transparency and accountability requirements. However, the transaction cost theory of
corporate governance would also include methods for restraining the authority of
management and standards for assessing progress with a view to making changes in the
composition of boards and management teams or systems.
Essentially since transaction costs are the most important factors the decisionmaking process within the company, a conflict of interest or insider dealing or any unethical
behavior would cost increase transaction costs to the detriment of the company.158 It can
therefore be assumed that when a company’s corporate governance framework is
constructed on transaction cost theory, managers are likely to carry out their duties ethically
and responsibly. However, building a corporate governance framework on the basis of
transaction cost theory will require a governance structure based on unrealistic and
unmeasurable, unpredictable and untenable expectations. There is no method for
determining whether a transaction cost governance structure will necessarily result in
prudent, ethical and competent directors and mangers. In fact, a corporate governance
structure based on the remuneration of directors and managers for reaching certain
milestones is far more likely have a better management outcome.

2.6 Conclusion
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Of the theories of corporate governance discussed in this chapter, it appears that
agency theory provides a more realistic method for establishing a corporate governance
framework for organizations. However, given the limits of the agency theory corporate
governance framework in the past, it has become a controversial solution to the agency
problems that tend to bring about difficulties in the management of companies. The
difficulties accepting the agency theory as the best framework of corporate governance
arises out of the fact that the Anglo-American model of corporate governance is constructed
on the basis of agency theory and yet, companies using the Anglo-American model of
corporate governance have failed to prevent corporate scandals.
Still, when the options are examined, too much is left to chance. For example, the
stewardship theory relies on the good will and ethical behavior of management. There is
no realistic method for requiring that management is motivated to manage a firm so that it
succeeds. Similarly, resource dependency and transaction costs theories expect to divert
management’s attention toward budgets, assets and resources as a means of promoting
good corporate behaviour. Therefore, as it currently stands, agency theory is the only
corporate governance theory that takes up the issue of the relationship between
management and owners. As such, it does not rely on the indirect management of this
relationship.
Agency theory imposes a fiduciary duty on managers and directors and if the
corporate governance framework it properly, and comprehensively designed it is very
likely to be successful for preventing insider dealing and other forms of opportunistic
behavior by managers and directors. The fiduciary duty of managers and directors is very
important for the appropriate management of any firm. It places the directors and managers
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in the position of trustees who act in the best interest of the true owners of the assets and
capital they have under their control. As trustees, it would be difficult for directors and
managers to simply ignore one category of shareholders/beneficiaries in favor of another
category.
Stakeholder theory is also a workable method for designing corporate governance
frameworks. However, due to the fact that there are many different stakeholders, most of
which are regulated by law, it is an unnecessary corporate governance theory. Labor laws
dictate how companies are required to treat their employees. Similarly, insolvency laws
direct how companies should treat their creditors. Contract laws regulate the relationship
between the company and suppliers. Environmental laws also regulate how the company
should treat the environment.
Philanthropy is one method by which a company can improve its image. However,
this should not form a part of corporate governance. What a company requires is a means
to regulate the relationship between managers and ownership. While some academics point
out the failure of the Anglo-American model to prevent some scandals, they also fail to
point out how the overwhelming majority of Anglo-American companies did not
experience scandals and are quite successful.
Even so, all companies can benefit from the corporate social responsibility
obligations contemplated by stakeholder theory of corporate governance. Corporate social
responsibility, although voluntary, can improve the relationship between the corporation
and its stakeholders, especially shareholders since it improves the image of the firm and
helps to solidify the public’s confidence in the company. The ethical behavior of the
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corporation helps in the construction of an admirable image and at the same time
establishes standards by which the corporation may hold all of its members to.
Based on the direct relationship between management and shareholders under the
agency theory of corporate governance, and the standard setting potential of corporate
social responsibility under the stakeholder theory, it is likely that a corporate governance
structure based on the convergence of these two theories will best serve the interest of
minority shareholders. After all, agency theory will provide a framework for ensuring that
management and directors are accountable to their shareholders. At the same time,
stakeholder theory and in particular, corporate social responsibility will ensure that
managers and directors act ethically and with integrity. In adopting these standards of
behavior, it is unlikely that the interest and rights of minority shareholders will be exploited
or neglected.
Even so, under the agency theory of corporate governance the emphasis is on the
relationship between the manager/director teams and the shareholders. A corporate
governance framework based on agency theory will obviously provide for accountability
to shareholders. This would therefore provide a corporate governance framework with the
clearest path toward facilitating derivative claims. There is no ambiguity about the
management teams’ responsibility toward the shareholders under the agency theory model
of corporate governance. There is no hierarchal structure of rights among shareholders
under this model of corporate governance. The rights of all owners/shareholders are
important and subject to protection.
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Chapter 3:
Minority Shareholders Under Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance
Laws and Regulations
3.1 Introduction
Saudi Arabia is going through significant legal reforms in several areas, particularly
in its economic and commercial areas. The purpose of the legal reforms in the economic
and commercial areas is to improve and diversify the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s economy.
These reforms are predicated on the fundamental goals and visions for the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia in the new plan to move its economy beyond oil.159 The Saudi plan is aimed
at reforming the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s economy so as to reduce its dependence on its
oil resources.160 Much of these reforms are centered around privatization and this means
decreasing government holdings while increasing private holdings.161
Essentially, the Saudi economic plan is aimed at attracting foreign investors as well
as encouraging local people to invest more on the Saudi stock market. This eventually sets
up the economy and commerce to position foreign investors as minority shareholders in a
market where family owned businesses are dominant. Foreign investors are positioned to
be minority shareholders because many of the viable and profitable sectors in Saudi Arabia
are closed to absolute foreign ownership although foreign investors may engage in joint
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ventures with a minority shareholding in these prohibitive sectors.162 This means that many
of the foreign investors attracted to Saudi Arabia will likely end up becoming minority
shareholders. Therefore, in order for Saudi Arabia to achieve its goals, the government of
Saudi Arabia will be required to provide greater and stronger minority shareholder
protection as well as a stronger enforcement system. Thus, this chapter will discuss Saudi
Arabia legal system in relation to minority shareholders.

3.2 Saudi Corporate Governance Framework
In the context of the corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, the Capital Market
Authority (CMA) was established in 2003 under the Capital Market Law of the same
year.163 The CMA is defined as a “semi-government body governed by a board whose
members are appointed.”164 There are five members in a permanent capacity and hold
above average credentials. The appointees are required to serve at least five years and their
tenure may be renewed one time only. Once appointed the CMA members nominate and
implement their chairman and deputy chairman and are paid pursuant to the Royal Order.
Among the duties assigned to the CMA are the implementation of rules and regulations
under the passed statutes or Royal Decrees. One of these responsibilities include the
implementation of corporate governance.165 This part of Chapter Three examines the
corporate governance of Saudi Arabia and in turn, the CMA and its governing authority in
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respect of corporate governance, along with the role of Saudi Ministry of Commerce and
Investment in respect of corporate governance laws and regulations.
3.2.1 Corporate Governance of Saudi Arabia

Sharia law is the main source of law in Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, Solomon
reports that there are three main factors impeding the efficiency of the reform of corporate
governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.166 The three factors are family ownership,
state ownership and religion.167 This is because state and family ownership impose some
restrictions and obstacles on how corporate governance frameworks can be implemented.
The reality is that family ownerships are hesitant about give any degree of control to
minority shareholders either family members or an outside investors. While religion is cited
as a constraint, Solomon argues that there is a fine line between ethical and fair corporate
governance principles and Sharia law.168
However, Sharia law contains a number of roles and principles for corporate
governance that are consistent with the protection of minority shareholder such as the fact
that the main rule guiding all business activities among Muslims is the requirement for
“honesty” and “fair dealing”.169 In fact, Slahudin compared corporate governance from the
perspective of Islamic values and principles with the corporate governance principles of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD). Slahudin came to
the conclusion that Islamic values and principles guiding corporate governance are broader
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than those found in the OECD.170 The OECD focuses on six specific issues while corporate
governance guided by Islamic law covers a larger stakeholder area and are concerned with
the “well-being of humanity, not just temporal needs, and not just the Muslim
community”.171
Ghatti and Bhatti also studied the principles of Sharia law in the context of
corporate governance and concluded that Sharia law is compatible with the stakeholder
theory of corporate governance.172 Ghatti and Bhatti also explain that the Sharia principle
of Hisba calls for honest and appropriate bookkeeping, open and frank disclosure and
transparency. An Islamic corporate governance model based on Sharia principles “would
encourage capital formation, foster strong markets, and encourage judgment and
transparency”.173
In addition, Hafeez also informs that Sharia principles require that corporations
maintain a decision-making process that are aimed “to gain grace of Almighty Allah”.174
Decision-makers behind the corporation are merely Allah’s trustees.175 As such, corporate
managers act in the best interest of the people of Allah. This is very similar to the Western
corporate governance models that require a system of “internal controls and risks
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management” of the board of directors who are also required to avoid conflicts of
interests.176
Essentially, Sharia law is compatible with a stakeholder theory of corporate
governance which in turn is the cornerstone of the Corporate Governance Principles
established by the G20 and the OECD.177 The OECD and G20 Corporate Governance
Principles were first introduced in 1998 and took account of the various stakeholders,
including employees, minority shareholders and consumers all of whom contribute to
economic growth.178
The CMA published Corporate Governance Regulations for listed companies and
corporate governance guidance which both embrace the principles covered by the
G20/OECD Corporate Governance Principles.179 This is because following the market
corrections in 2006, Saudi Arabia began to realize how important corporate governance
regulations were.180
The corporate governance principles captured by the G20/OECD Corporate
Governance Principles and captured by the CMA’s corporate governance regulations
include monitoring and enforcement the regulations and principles, recognizing the rights
and fair treatment of all shareholders including the right to share information and to
participate; the assignment of fiduciary roles to investors; honest information sharing;
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recognizing and supporting stakeholder interests, honest disclosure and transparency;
regulation of directors, management, reporting and accounting processes.181
According to the World Bank, the corporate governance regulations and guidance
issued by the CMA reflects that corporate governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are
consistent with international standards. Yet, the World Bank notes that there are some
challenges. The main challenge is that the corporate governance principles are only
applicable to publicly listed companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This is
problematic because a majority of larger and more successful companies in Saudi Arabia
are family-owned. As such these companies are private companies and companies not
listed comply with Sharia law and Saudi companies law. Saudi companies law and Sharia
law’s applicable corporate governance provisions are broad and not very concise.
Therefore, interpreting and applying these broad principles and values into a coherent
corporate governance structure is difficult.182
Be that as it may, publicly listed companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are
obligated to subscribe to a comply or explain rule in relation to how they comply with the
CMA’s Corporate Governance Regulations. Although companies in Saudi Arabia are
coming around to the significance of corporate governance for the success of the company,
compliance is weak. In the meantime, enforcement is weak as the CMA is mindful of how
strict enforcement might discourage the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia companies becoming
publicly listed.183
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Companies Law 2015 issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MOCI)
is applicable to all types of companies, traded on the stock market or not. The new
Companies Law came into effect in May 2016. Its primary goal is the improvement of the
protection of the rights of minority shareholder. Other improvements include conflicts of
interest regulations and joint stock company provisions.184
In line with international standards of corporate governance, the new Companies
Law requires that all companies in Saudi Arabia implement and maintain written Articles
of Association.185 Article 71(1) of the Companies Law 2015, deals with conflict of interest
and in doing so requires that any board member “may not have a direct or indirect interest
in transactions or contracts completed in the benefit of the company” unless the board
member first obtains the Ordinary General Assembly’s consent and the transaction is in
“accordance with the controls set by the competent authority”.186 Similarly, Article 72 of
the 2015 Act requires that board members refrain from carrying on transactions that
compete with the company unless permission is obtained from the Ordinary General
Assembly.187
For the purpose of this research study, Article 80 provides the most relevant new
law. Pursuant to Article 80, the company “may be charged the expenses incurred by the
shareholder to file a claim against the company, whatever the result thereof provided it was
done” if the shareholder’s claim was filed in “good faith”, if the shareholder provides the
company with the “reason” for filing the claim and “did not receive a reply within” one
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month; if the claim “serves the interest of the company” and if the claim is “properly
founded.”188 However, Article 80 will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3 below.
Additional corporate governance regulations can be found in Article 104 which
provides that the company’s Audit Committee has the responsibility to review the
company’s financial statements, reports and notes and: “provide feedback on them, if any,
and prepare a report on its opinion on the adequacy of the company’s internal control
system or its other activities that fall within its jurisdictions.”189 To sum up, the new
Companies Law reflects reforms aimed at increasing minority shareholder rights and
improving risk management in Saudi Arabian companies.
However, there are institutions and bodies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that are
important to any understanding of corporate governance in the country.
The Ministry of Commerce and Investment: The main government authority which has
the obligation to oversees regulatory measures and corporate governance is the Ministry of
Commerce and Investment. The Ministry was established by Royal Decree in 1954.190
Initially, the Ministry started out as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and it was
tasked with regulating local and international trade and its growth. The Ministry of Finance
eventually moved the Benchmark Registration department to the Ministry of Commerce
and Investment.191
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Subsequently, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry established the Association
of Companies for the supervision of implementing company law and requirement
revisions. The Ministry also took on the role of establishing commercial and investment
processes inclusive of the Commercial Registry and Foreign Capital Systems among
others. With expanding roles in investment and commerce, the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry was eventually changed to the Ministry of Commerce and Investment.192 Among
its many responsibilities, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment is responsible for
certifying that the all registered companies are performed with full compliance with the
Companies Law, good corporate governance principles and respect for shareholders’ rights
provided by the law.193 The ministry is the body monitoring and enforcing the company
laws for any violation, even against listed companies.194
The Capital Market Authority: The CMA is responsible for administering and regulating
the Capital Market Law applicable only to listed companies. As such, the CMA is
independent legally, administratively and financially. The CMA reports to the President of
the Council of Ministries, an office which is occupied by the King of Saudi Arabia.195 The
Capital Market Law confers upon the CMA executive and legislative powers for the issuing
of regulating activities in the market. The CMA may also establish rules, enforce
regulations and has the compulsory authority to carry out its responsibilities. The CMA is
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at liberty to compel witnesses, harvest evidence and demand the production of
documentary evidence that the CMA might require during the course of an investigation.196
As a semi-governmental body with an appointed board, the CMA is also subject to
its own form of corporate governance. Essentially, the CMA is a market oversight
institution.197 For the purpose of this dissertation, the most significant regulation passed by
the CMA is Corporate Governance Regulations and Guidance. The Market Conduct
Regulations and Merger and Acquisition Regulations are among other regulations passed
by the CMA.
The primary role of the CMA is to foster a corporate atmosphere in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia that is consistent with transparency and fairness in commercial
transactions. Thus, the CMA monitors information disclosure relative to securities and
listed companies. The CMA also adjusts transactions by the stock exchange and listed
companies.
The CMA delegated oversight of the corporate governance regulations to The
General Department of Corporate Governance. In addition, the CMA established the
Securities Disputes Committee which remains under the authority of the CMA. The CRSD
and the Securities Conflict Appeal Committee are very important for the implementation
and enforcement of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia.198
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The CRSD may preside over a number of disputes including complaints against
parties who have not complied with the Capital Market Laws and have failed to implement
regulations. The CRSD may also resolve or adjudicate over disputes initiated by investors
against individuals and entities in power. The CRSD may also adjudicate over complaints
and challenges against CMA regulations and processes as well as those put forward by the
Stock Exchange. The CRSD may also hear and determine temporary issues. Still, the
CRSD is not at liberty to take on cases without the consent of the CMA.
The Securities Conflict Appeal Committee consist of three members that are
nominated by the Council of Ministers’ Royal Decree. The members serve a renewable
three-year term. The nominated members are usually selected from the Ministries of
Finance and Commerce and Investment as well as the Bureau of Experts serving under the
Council of Ministers. A CRSD decision is appealable to the Securities Conflict Appeal
Committee. Appeals must be filed within a month of the decision. Whether an appeal is
accepted or denied is up to the Securities Conflict Appeal Committee. Whatever decision
is made on accepting or denying the appeal is final and binding.
The Saudi Stock Exchange: Until the passage of the Capital Market Law 2003, the KSA
“did not have a stock exchange”.199 Shares were traded via the depository center of national
securities. The trade was unregulated and thus the interest of investors were unprotected.
Under the Capital Market Law the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange (SASE) was created and
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the Saudi Arabian Securities and Exchange Commission, now known as the CMA was
expected to regulate it.200
The CMA was charged with the responsibility of ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s
capital market was organized, providing for the protection of investors against “unfair
practices”, ensuring the capital market functions efficiently, ensuring transparency in
securities, and managing securities’ trade.201
3.2.2 Ownership Structure in Saudi Arabia Stock Market

Saudi Arabia’s stock exchange market, also known as the Tadawul, is the Gulf
region’s largest exchange market. As of 2008, its market capital was US$325 billion
representing 70% of the country’s GDP.202 There is no doubt that the Saudi stock exchange
is booking and promises to be an attractive investment opportunity.
Saudi Arabia’s market is “rife with issues like concentrated liquidity in the hands
of a few, influential shareholders, institutions or government”.203 The greatest challenge
for the rights of minority shareholders is the fact that the most glaring feature of the
economy of Saudi Arabia is that family ownership in stock exchange companies are
dominant. In fact, five of Saudi Arabia’s ten largest companies are family-owned. Among
the five large family owned companies is Kingdom Holding Company which is owned by
Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal.204
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Moreover, both the fourth and ninth largest Saudi Companies (Dallah Al-Baraka
Group and Olayan Financing Company) are owned respectively by the Saleh Kamel and
Olayan families. It is also true that the government of Saudi Arabia owns a large share of
the country’s companies although 70% of companies in the country are family-owned.205
The obvious solution in terms of attracting foreign investors is a good corporate governance
structure that specifically assures and protects the rights of minority shareholders.
For the most part, companies listed on the Stock Exchange in Saudi Arabia are
comprised of four groups of shareholders: sate, family, institutions and block-holders.206
Ownership structure is linked directly to voluntary disclosure. Evidence from Saudi Arabia
have shown a significant reluctance of listed companies to subscribe to voluntary
disclosure. A 2007 report on the stock exchange in Saudi Arabia shows that several listed
companies on the stock exchange “violated disclosure guidelines.”207
The fact is, companies are required by companies law and corporate governance
regulation to disclose some information about its business for shareholders, creditors,
consumers, investors and other stakeholders. Studies have consistently shown that
compulsory disclosure falls short of stakeholder expectations. The additional information
known as voluntary disclosure is usually sufficient to satisfy investors and other
stakeholders.208
The failure to comply with compulsory disclosure and to subscribe to voluntary
disclosure obviously plays a significant role in the lack of interest by foreign investors to
205
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invest in Saudi companies. According to Mgammal, Birgit Ebner who is employed by
Germany’s Frankfurt Trust and aids in managing stock funds in the Middle East, Saudi
Arabia was not “an attractive investment area compared with others in the region, one of
the main reasons is the absence of voluntary disclosure as a result of lack of information
disclosure by companies operating in the country.”209
The high concentration of family ownership among companies on Saudi Arabia’s
stock exchange is problematic for reasons other than the lack of disclosure. As de Holan
and Sanz observed, a majority of the family owned companies in the world are located in
countries where minority shareholder protection is “weak”.210 Moreover, agency problems
within the family-owned company is typically worse than in other companies and the
protection of minority shareholders is at a greater risk.211
The family owned company is more complex than an ordinary business and the
companies that are suited to the corporate governance models offered by the OECD and
the CMA. What distinguishes the family-owned business from other companies is
obviously, the ownership structure.212 Many of these family-owned businesses are owned
and controlled by the family and while there are minority shareholders, there is a tendency
for businesses owned and controlled by the family to fall into a trap in which the family
tends to avoid transparency and disclosure. Therefore, the agency problems within a
family-owned company are heightened.
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In addition, management in family owned businesses tend to focus on the interest
of the family controlling the business.213 This practice comes at the expense of other
shareholders and especially minority shareholders.214 Still, there have been theories and
research indicating that agency problems are less in the family owned company.215 Family
management can act as stewards of the firm and in doing so, they are unable to separate
the company’s interest in maximizing shareholder value and their own financial success.216
Davis of Harvard Business School explains why the standardized corporate
governance framework is incompatible with the reality of the family owned business. The
standardized corporate governance is determined to improve corporate governance by
improving the quality of boards and increasing shareholder participation. However, in the
family-owned business, these kinds of corporate governance frameworks do not take into
account the fact that family owned businesses are comprised of board members and
shareholders who are primarily family members.217
Still, a corporate governance framework is very important for the family-owned
business. As Tricker reports, when a family owned business adopts an efficient governance
framework, they will experience growth and expansion.218 There are factors and risks
unique to the family owned business that corporate governance must take into account. For
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example, the movement of a family member upward in the company can “cause
resentment” among other family members who feel overlooked.219
The movement of the family member up in the business can also upset employees
and other stakeholders who perceive that the promotion of that family member is not on
the merits, but based on favoritism and/or nepotism. This can create conflicts within the
family and therefore, within the company. Corporate governance principles and standards
do not take into account how these kinds of personal conflicts can bear down on the
company.
Minority shareholders and stakeholders will not usually feel able to commit to a
family owned business because of the risk of family members of the family operating with
a sense of entitlement. The most obvious sense entitlement surrounds the notion that family
members should hold status roles within their family’s firm. As a result, there is always a
risk that family members will advance within the firm with or without the requisite skills.
When family members or any member of a firm is promoted without having earned
the new position, they develop a heightened sense of entitlement. With this heightened
sense of entitlement and a position of authority, the family member feels exempt from
accountability and transparency. This is particularly damaging to other shareholders,
especially minority shareholders who feel isolated from the company. The family owned
business therefore ends up with an agency cost known as “self-control”.220
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These agency costs are not mitigated in Saudi Arabia because while the CMA
adopted corporate governance principles reflecting the OECD and G20’s international
standards, no provisions have been made to provide a corporate governance framework
that reflects the agency costs in family owned businesses. A corporate governance
framework for a family owned business would necessarily be structured for “the family
and for the family business”.221 The structures are aimed at improving the processes for
control and interactions between family participants and non-family management.222
The Ministry of Commerce and Investment has taken the initiative to encourage
family owned businesses in the KSA to adopt corporate governance principles and
standards tailored for family owned business agency costs. This initiative was revealed in
the publication of a draft corporate governance framework for family owned businesses.223
The Ministry of Commerce and Investment recommended that family owned
companies establish an internal control mechanism which includes and describes the
family’s values and objectives and to ensure that these values and objectives guide the
generations of the family involved in the operation of the business. The draft corporate
governance rules for family owned businesses in Saudi Arabia should also ensure that
future generations of family members become involved in the company as early as
possible.224
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The Ministry of Commerce and Investment also suggested that family owned
businesses in the KSA install a family board for companies with large numbers of family
members involved in the business. These boards should consist of between five and nine
older family members. The family board should be responsible for “supervising the
performance of the board of directors (without interfering with the independence and
autonomy of the latter”.225
The family board should also offer “guidance and assistance to the assembly of
shareholders” and should supervise “the implementation of the internal rules”.226 The
family board should also aid in the resolution of family disputes and should play a pivotal
role in preparing future generations for taking over the company at some point in the future.
Perhaps, more importantly, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment also encouraged
family owned businesses in the KSA to implement and practice policies and practices that
ensure that family members are qualified for the positions they are appointed to.227
Essentially, a family oriented corporate governance framework together with
independent directors is the best option for family owned businesses. As it now stands, the
family owned business in the KSA operates on a control governance framework. The
control model is typically structured with a high concentration of shareholders with
“illiquid shares” and is very private and secret. The control structured company also
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operates with a high number of insiders sitting on the board with a high level of
owner/management processes.228
A shift away from high ownership/management processes appears to be necessary.
A study conducted Hammouda confirms why the installation of independent directors and
the move away from the control model is important. Hammouda studied data from 27
family owned companies in Tunisia. The results of the study revealed that foreign investors
were reluctant to invest in the firms with “high family ownership” and firms “where the
family is involved in management”.229
Since foreign investors are reluctant to invest in family owned and managed firms,
the ownership structure of a firm is very important. In order to mitigate the challenges for
family owned businesses is to incorporate and manage corporate governance tailored to the
family owned business. It can be assumed that foreign investors do not want to invest in
family owned businesses due to the more complex agency costs. If those agency costs are
mitigated investors would be more willing to invest in the family owned business.

3.3 Minority Shareholders Protections under the Saudi Legal System
In order to understand the significance of Sharia law to the regulation of the
protection of minority shareholders, it is important to understand just what Sharia law is.
Sharia law is not merely a legal system of law. It is a reflection of Islamic beliefs, values
and practices. For the most part, Sharia law directs just how Muslims are required to live
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and carry out their daily activities in both their personal and commercial lives.230 These
religious values and practices comprising Sharia law are the hallmarks of what can be
expected of those in control of companies and how they treat and protect the rights and
interests of minority shareholders.
Sharia law is the supreme law of Saudi Arabia. Although, the term corporate social
responsibility is not specified under the Sharia law, its tenets as they relate to the protection
of minority shareholders are consistent with Sharia values and principles. For example,
Corporate Social Responsibility requires philanthropy. Under Sharia values and principles,
individuals and organizations must carry out their business honestly, with concerns about
society and the “less fortunate”.231 Moreover, CSR requirements for companies to consider
the interest of all stakeholders including shareholders are compatible with Sharia law.232
It is therefore hardly surprising that under the Sharia law, the protection of the
rights of minority shareholders is predicated on the duty of good faith.233 Good faith is
guided by mutual trust and this is an implied term of the contractual relationship between
minority shareholders and majority shareholders of companies complying with the Sharia
law.234 What this means is that minority and remote shareholders can have confidence in
or trust majority shareholders and those who are involved in the day-to-day activities of
the company to act in good faith.
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The doctrine of good faith is derived from a verse in the Quran which reads as
follows “Fulfil the covenant of God when you have entered into it and break not your oaths
after you have confirmed them.”235
In all Islamic financial and commercial transactions, the contractual arrangements
between all of the parties must be honoured in terms of capital and risk sharing. The
preceding verse from the Qu’ran has been constructed to imply that these relationships are
guided by good faith. In this regard, good faith together with “honesty, disclosure,
truthfulness and sincerity” provide the moral and ethical codes for the interpretation and
application of these contractual relationships.236
In terms of the relationship between minority shareholders and the company or
those who are in control of the company, these Islamic values and practices may be
comforting. However, unless the minority shareholder is also Islamic and aware of the
strengths of these values and practices, the tenets guiding commercial contractual
relationships will not have much persuasive value.
Still, a closer examination of this aspect of the Sharia law reveals that minority and
remote shareholders are at the mercy of majority and active shareholders.237 After all,
majority and active shareholders are in charge of the company. Sharia law requires that
minority and remote shareholders put their trust in those who are in charge of the company.
Still Sharia law is interpreted together with Islamic beliefs, values and practices.
One resulting tenet of Sharia law is Zakat. Zakat requires “giving to the poor” which is “an
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important religious practice in Islam”.238 Muslims place a high premium on “honor and
courage” which are partially manifested through empathy toward those who are less
fortunate.239 It would therefore follow that within the company, the majority shareholders
valuing courage and honor will do their best to take into account the interest and rights of
minority shareholders who are less fortunate. However, when thinking about the foreign
investor with no knowledge of Islamic values and practices and the vague nature of Sharia
law on minority shareholder protection, this Sharia practice and value is not likely to be
reassuring.
Although Islamic values, principles, beliefs and practices present a convincing
background for believing that minority shareholders are protected, it is not explicit enough
to create certainty. The non-Muslim minority shareholder will have to acquire a full and
clear understanding of Islamic values, beliefs and practices in order to believe that their
interest and rights are in good and trusting hands. Non-Muslims and foreigners in particular
are more likely to look to statutes for more detailed explanations.
Thus, foreign and non-Muslim minority shareholders are expected to look at the
Company law of Saudi Arabia to gain some insight into how minority shareholders are
treated under the law. The current law strengthens the protections of minority shareholders
when compared to the Company Law preceding it. The previous relevant law was the
Company Law of 1965.

238

Harold G. Koenig & Saad Al Shohaig, Health and Well-Being in Islamic Societies: Background,
Research, and Applications, 35 (2014).
239
Id.

69

Pursuant to the Company Law of 1965, shareholder power is constructed so that
the minority shareholders have limited protective rights. In the meantime, the power of the
company is held by majority shareholders. Realistically, one can expect that majority
shareholder may focus on their own vision and goals without troubling themselves with
what minority shareholders might want. It is also likely that in responding to the power
vested in majority shareholders, executives within the company are predisposed to
concerning themselves with the interest of the majority shareholders to the detriment of
minority shareholders.
To start with, under the 1965 Company law, the company’s powers are split between
the General Meeting of shareholders and the company’s directors.240 The two factions
appear to be equal in terms of the distribution of power and the right to veto the actions of
the other. In general, the board of directors may not interfere in general meetings of
shareholders. Directors can expect to be unfettered in the execution of their authority.
However, if they wish to make decisions that extend their authority, they may only do so
with the permission of the General Meeting of shareholders.241
Thus, the division of power and control between the board of directors and the
General Meeting of shareholders provides a method by which shareholders can participate
in the company and keep an eye on directors. However, this is problematic for minority
shareholders who are located in remote locations. Unable or unmotivated to attend general
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meetings, these shareholders will have to place their trust and confidence in majority
shareholders to monitor the work of the board of directors.
For the most part, minority shareholders in any company have a tendency “not to
participate in the decision-making process” of companies and “their voice is rarely
heard”.242 Participation in the decision-making process is very important for setting the
stage to the right to derivative claims. The fact that minority shareholders rarely participate
in the company’s decision-making process leads to a failure to step up when this class of
shareholders have a conflict with decisions that have been made. According to Solomon,
when minority shareholders have a disagreement with how the company is being managed,
they would rather sell their shares than express disapproval.243
Solomon argues that from the utilitarian view of the firm, minority shareholder
participation is the foundation of democratic values. When minority shareholders give
expression to their perspectives, agency costs are reduced and from the outside the
company is easier to trust. This results in better financial development.244 This is because
investors will feel more comfortable investing in a company in which minority
shareholders have a voice and exercise that voice. In the KSA, where foreign investors are
more likely to belong to the minority shareholder category, trust and confidence in the
protection and promotion of their rights are important.
The problem in Saudi Arabia and in many other countries including the US is that
many companies have concentrated ownership. This means that majority shareholders are
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held by a select few.245 This select few generally control the company for the most part and
minority shareholders choose to limit their participation. If by any chance they learn of
malfeasance on the part of directors, rather than participating to undo the wrongs to the
company, minority shareholders would rather sell their shares.246
It is important to note just how seriously concerning concentrated ownership is.
First, in the case of concentrated ownership, one or very few shareholders own a large share
of the company. Minority shareholders usually outnumber the small number of majority
shareholders. Yet, the majority shareholders have the greatest voice and maintain control
of the company. In the meantime, minority shareholders yield no power and very little
voice.247
Obviously, the lack of interest in the company’s directors’ handling of business and
apathy in general is not a desirable outcome. Shareholders participation is important to
ensure optimal outcomes for the company. Where shareholder participation makes the most
difference is in the company’s corporate governance.248 This is because, shareholders keep
an eye on directors and since they have the right to replace directors, this puts pressure on
directors to safeguard the interest of the company and shareholders. More particularly,
shareholder participation in corporate governance, ensures that they have the information
and accountability necessary for making sound decisions about the company’s business.
Therefore, all shareholders, including minority shareholders should participate in the
company’s corporate governance.
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information/transparency and accountability. Saudi Arabia moved beyond the 1965
Company Law with a view to improving the protection of minority shareholders and to
encourage greater shareholder participation in the company. Recognizing the importance
of transparency, the CMA’s Corporate Governance Regulations as amended in 2010
provides that companies are required to confer upon all shareholders access to accurate
information in a timely fashion to facilitate the ability to act on their rights and concerns
within the company.249
Treatment of all shareholders. Article 4 of the 2017 regulations requires that all
shareholders are treated fairly and that the company publish clear details of how they will
“guarantee that all shareholders exercise their rights”.250 The obvious difficulty with this
part of Article 4 is that it does not lay out whether the company is obliged to only set out
statutory rights or if it should come up with its own set of rights for shareholders in addition
to the statutory rights.
Moreover, Article 4 imposes a duty on the board of directors to “seek shareholders’
rights protection to ensure fairness and equality among them”.251 However, there appears
to be a caveat that does not bode well for minority shareholders. Article 4 also provides
that: “The board and the executive management of the company is obliged not to
discriminate among shareholders who own the same class of shares nor prevent them from
accessing any of their rights.”252
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The first challenge of note is that in family owned companies, the board and
executive management of the company are likely family members who own and manage
the company. If not, board and executive management will likely always seek to promote
the interest of the family ownership. In other words, the ability to distinguish between
shareholder rights and interest is more likely to be clouded when owners and managers are
one and the same.
The second challenge relates to the working of Article 4 in the excerpt above. The
board and the executive management are only required to ensure that they treat everyone
in a specific class of shareholding exactly the same. Therefore, the board and the executive
management are not obliged to treat all classes of shareholders exactly the same way in
exercising their rights. This means that minority shareholders can be treated very
differently from majority shareholders as long as all minority shareholders are treated
exactly the same. If the rights of one shareholder is constrained in the exercise of his or her
rights, this manner of treatment will be acceptable, provided all minority shareholders are
constrained. These constraints will not be lifted is majority shareholders have
unconstrained rights.
Article 5 of the 2017 Regulations does improve the position of minority
shareholders by providing that all shareholder rights in relation to their shares are
guaranteed especially certain rights.253 The most important rights relative to derivative
action is contained in Article 5(3), (5), (6), (7), (10) and (11). The rights contained in these
provisions are: the right to “attend the General or Special Shareholders Assemblies, take
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part in their deliberation and vote on their decisions”; to “request viewing the books and
documents of the company” including information that reveals the company’s operations
or “breach of the Companies Law and Capital Market Law”; to “monitor the performance
of the company and the activities of the board”; to “hold the Board members accountable,
to file liability lawsuits against them and appeal for nullification of the resolution of the
General and Special Shareholders Assemblies” pursuant to the Companies Law and the
company’s bylaws; to request access to the articles of association and bylaws if they are
not publicly available; and to “nominate and elect the Board Members”.254
Basically, Article 5 opens up the possibility for minority shareholders to initiate
derivative actions. In order to make a decision about derivative claims, minority
shareholders need information that puts them in a position to take such action. Therefore,
Article 6 of the CMA’s 2017 Corporate Governance Regulations is very important. Article
6 provides that the Board is bound to “make available to shareholder complete, clear,
accurate and non-misleading information” to ensure that the shareholder is able to
“properly exercise his/her rights”.255
Once again, another caveat appears in a provision purporting to promote and protect
the rights of shareholders. The caveat appears in Article 6 which goes on to state that the
information “shall be provided at the proper times and shall be updated regularly”.256 This
appears to be a caveat to the right to information because Article 6 fails to explain what is
meant by proper times and who decides what proper times mean. Moreover, the it is not
clear what regular updating means and who determines what constitutes regular updating.
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Therefore, this apparent caveat gives management and owners a loophole through which
information may not be provided in a timely fashion or at all.
Article 6 however, does provide some encouraging rights relative to information
access. Article 6 goes on to provide that the information shall be shared in “clear and
detailed” manner and “shall include a list of the company’s information that the
shareholders may obtain”.257 This part of Article 6 is very encouraging in that the
information shared is required to be unambiguous and in detail. Yet, the provision that the
shareholder shall have a list of the information available to him/her is troubling. This is
troubling because this provision does not set out how the information can be limited and
who can limit the information shareholders have access to.
More troubling is the provision that “this information shall be available to all
shareholders of the same class”.258 Again, this provision appears to be setting the stage for
discrimination between classes of shareholders. The information available to one class of
shareholders must be exactly the same for each shareholder. This means that majority
shareholders can obtain information that minority shareholders are not able to access.
The final part of Article 6 appears to contradict this presumption by adding that:
The company shall use the most effective methods in communicating with shareholders
and shall not discriminate among shareholders in respect of providing information.259 In
other words, all information should be accessible by, and available to all shareholders,
regardless of the quantity of shares held.
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Still, this provision is confusing because it is not clear whether the nondiscriminatory provision refers to the manner in which information is transferred to
shareholders or the information itself. However, the preceding part of Article 6 makes it
clear that each class of shareholders are able to gain access to information in ways that
differ from other classes of shareholders. Therefore, it can reasonably be concluded that
the final part of Article 6 only provides that all shareholders are to be treated exactly the
same with regards to how information they are entitled to is communicated.
Article 7 also appears to present obstacles to derivative claims by minority
shareholders. Article 7(a) provides that the “board shall ensure communication between
the company and the shareholders” on the basis of the “common understanding of the
strategic objectives and interests of the company”.260 This provision is problematic for two
reasons. First communication can be limited by the company’s strategic objectives and its
interests and it appears that the strategic objectives and interests are highly subjective so
that they can change from time to time. The agency costs are increased in the family owned
business because the owner/manager may come to the conclusion that it is not in the
company’s interest or outside of the company’s strategic objective to communicate with
minority shareholders. Thus, transparency and accountability can still be compromised and
the right to derivative claims by minority shareholders may be impossible.
In addition, Article 7(b) provides that the board’s chairman and the Chief Executive
Officer shall “inform the remaining Board members of the opinions of the shareholders”.261
When this provision is read together with Article 7(c) it is obvious that the CMA 2017
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Regulations provides companies with a tool to isolate shareholders from the board. Article
7(c) of the 2017 Regulations provides that shareholders may not “intervene in the
operations of the Board or the work of the Executive Management of the company unless
he/she is a member of the board or its management team” or unless such intervention takes
place via the Ordinary General Assembly pursuant to its authority or limitations and
conditions imposed by the board.262
Simply put, Article 7 of the CMA’s 2017 Corporate Governance Regulations makes
it entirely difficult for minority shareholders to act on the information they are promised.
The limitations imposed on shareholders in respect of their interaction with the board is an
obstacle to derivative claims. To begin with, the opinions of shareholders are only
communicated indirectly to the board. In other words, participation in issues pertaining to
the board’s operation is entirely limited and based indirect communications. The obstacles
presented in Article 7 only harm the rights of minority shareholders. Owners who are
managers and therefore majority shareholders can limit what minority shareholders know
and how much they participate in the company’s business. Therefore, the right to derivative
claims can be limited by the company’s corporate governance structure.
Still Article 79 of the new Saudi Arabian Companies Law does provide minority
shareholders with the right to make derivative claims. However, these claims may only be
proceeded with if the shareholder first obtains permission to file such a claim from the
general assembly and the appropriate directors of the company. In the event, the general
assembly denies the request for the filing of a derivative claim, the minority shareholder’s
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only resource is a civil or tortious suit in the name of the aggrieved shareholder and at his
or her own expense.
In a family owned company where the general assembly is likely controlled by
owners who are also managers, the likelihood of obtaining a derivative claim is dismal.
Therefore, the prospect of having to file a civil or tortious claim at the shareholder’s
expense will serve to act as a deterrence against seeking derivative claims. To begin with,
the shareholder seeking a civil or tortious claim will necessarily be required to prove
damages personal to him or her. This is very difficult for a shareholder seeking derivative
suits on the basis of harm to the company and trickle-down damages to the shareholder.
The claim is typically in response to activities that may have harmed the company or are
likely to harm the company. Quite simply, the prospect of having to resort to a civil or
tortious claim is not an incentive inducing option as the shareholder’s desire to file a
derivative claim is based on his or her interest in the company’s welfare and are not related
to personal damages. The civil and tortious options require personal damages in order to
sustain a law suit.
In the derivative claim itself, the minority shareholder must be able to show a
relationship between the damages and the relevant company operatives. As revealed above,
the 2017 Corporate Governance Regulations provides company managers and owners with
methods to limit information. Therefore, if directors or other operatives with the power to
limit information are indeed responsible for damages to the company, they may interpret
the subjective parts of their corporate governance framework to manipulate or limit the
information they share with shareholders and therefore limit their ability to bring a
derivative claim.
79

Still it is refreshing to know that under the new Saudi Company law and the new
Corporate Governance Framework, the right to file a derivative claim is not prohibited.263
The direct civil and tortious suit although discouraging by prescription is an alternative
remedy all the same. Essentially, it is difficult to disagree with the findings of Al-Habshan
who stated that, while Saudi Arabia has made significant changes to its legal landscape
regarding company law, “the legal system of Saudi Arabia, as it stands, does not afford
adequate protection for minority shareholders”.264
While Saudi Arabia’s law does permit minority shareholders to take derivative action,
the board of directors appears to be untouchable in regard to what may appear to be unfair
or unlawful conduct within the company. The restrictions on this right arise out of the fact
that the action must be taking prior to occurrence of the conduct or activities complained
of.265 Therefore, if a derivative claim is intended to prevent serious harm to the company,
the right to file such a claim is futile.
Based on the 2017 Regulations and new Companies Law it is obvious that the board
is basically untouchable. As Al-Habshan points out, minority shareholders in Saudi Arabian
companies do not have the right to request “a review of any behavior or actions once they
have occurred”.266 In other words, minority shareholders have no remedies against
mismanagement especially since their only alternative is a civil or tortious claim where
they must prove personal damages.
Al-Habshan goes on to explain that it is up to majority shareholders to take action
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against company operatives who mismanage or otherwise harm the company. Even so,
courts are more likely to take account of claims by majority shareholders so as to preserve
the smooth operations of the company. Moreover, when there is “an abuse of power” it is
entirely up to the majority shareholders to “hold directors accountable for their actions” or
to terminate those directors who bend the boundaries of their authority.267
After reviewing the current status of the Company Law in Saudi Arabia, Al-Habshan
concluded that majority shareholders hold the bulk of the power in companies in the
KSA.268 Therefore, derivative action on the part of minority shareholders is only available
on paper. The difficulties restraining action by minority shareholders leaves only one
possibility: shareholder agreements.269
Al-Habshan pointed out that in the KSA, shareholders are at liberty to put together
a shareholders’ agreement which may contain “whatever clauses and terms they wish”
provided those terms and conditions are compatible with company law.270 Shareholder
agreements permit shareholder self-protection when coping with contentious matters. In
the absence of a thoroughly prepared shareholder agreement, the consequences for
minority shareholders are dire in light of the obstacles to derivative claims.
The need for minority shareholder protection is very important in light of the KSA’s
new plan and the underlying goal of diversification and the quest for attracting foreign
investment. The degree to which shareholders are protected by the law of a host country
will play a pivotal role in the decision of foreign investors when forum shopping.271 In fact,
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all investors, both local and foreign are more comfortable with a company where
shareholder protection is stable and enforceable. The protection of shareholder rights is
indicative of an open, transparent, ethical and accountable firm. Such a firm is more likely
to attract investors from abroad and at home.272
While the Sharia Law requires honesty, good ethics, fair treatment and so on, there
are obvious challenges in the company law and the corporate governance regulations of the
KSA. As demonstrated in this chapter, there are loopholes in the CMA’s Corporate
Governance Regulations of 2017 that prioritize the rights of majority shareholders.
Similarly, the operation of the most recent Company Law does nothing to advance the right
of minority action on behalf of the company.
Despite the fact that the KSA has taken steps to reform its company law and in
doing so has conferred upon minority shareholders the right for derivative claims, the
majority still rules. In a family owned company where owners manage the company,
minority shareholders are even more disadvantaged. Therefore, the rights of minority
shareholders are inadequately protected in the KSA and are even less protected in family
owned companies. This is a critical issue requiring urgent attention because family
ownership is the dominant ownership structure of companies listed on the stock exchange
of the KSA.

3.4 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter reviewed law, policies and practices in the KSA relevant for the
protection of minority shareholders. Essentially, it was discovered and discussed that the
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KSA in its desire to diversify its economy, has made sweeping economic and legal reforms.
At the heart of the reforms pursuant to the new Saudi economic plan, the KSA wants to
attract foreign investors. In order to do so, the KSA realizes that corporate governance
reflecting shareholder protection is important. Therefore, the CMA’s efforts to improve
corporate governance corresponds with the new Company Law and improvement of
shareholder protection. One improvement of note is the right of minority shareholders to
file derivative claim. However, there are obstacles to the implementation of the derivative
claim by minority shareholders. As it appears, despite reform of corporate governance
regulation and the company law, majority shareholders continue to maintain significant
power to the detriment of minority shareholders. The compatibility of the CMA and
international standards of corporate governance with Saudi companies is also questionable
since a majority of the companies listed with KSA’s stock exchange are family owned. The
agency costs are already significant in family owned companies and the lack of adequate
protection of minority shareholder rights only increase those agency costs.
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Chapter 4:

Derivative Suit in Comparative Countries
4.1 Introduction
As previously discussed, this thesis explores and describes the derivative suit under
Saudi Arabia’s Companies Law. It has also been established that Saudi Arabia has set the
diversification of its economy with an emphasis on attracting foreign investors as a longterm goal. As such, this study provides insight on derivative claims under Saudi Arabia’s
Companies Law as a means of determining how Saudi Arabia can strengthen shareholder
protection laws and policies to the benefit of foreign investors.
Of particular concern is Article 79 of the New Saudi Companies Law. Under Article
79, a shareholder can submit a request to the general assembly for permission to file a
lawsuit against the relevant company’s directors. If the general assembly fails to take
action, then the right of the shareholder is limited to filing a direct lawsuit or a tort claim,
under the name of the shareholder and at his or her expense. This provision obviously
functions more as a discouragement rather than an incentive for pursuing a derivative
claim.
Moreover, the right to a civil lawsuit also has a limited incentive for shareholders
with minority holdings to pursue what is called derivative suit because it requires proof of
personal damages to the shareholders not the company. In addition, the issue of causation
is pertinent. The shareholder pursuing the "derivative claim" must also prove that the
alleged damages were caused by the wrongful decision of the corporate directors.
Complicating the "derivative suit", the shareholder must also prove that there was a
relationship between the damages and the wrongdoing of the corporate representatives.
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Proving the relationship between personal damages and the wrongdoing of directors is very
difficult and costly, especially on the part of small investors with limited knowledge,
expertise, and money to seek legal advice and representation against a large company with
substantially more resources. Therefore, this chapter examines derivative suit in different
countries in order to propose the best comparable practice for Saudi Arabia legal system.

4.2 Derivative Suit in the US
In the US the derivative suit follows the rule in the UK’s Foss v Harbottle which
establishes what is known as the “proper party principle” in litigation against those who
harm the company.273 The proper party principle is important because it suggests that only
the company may litigate an issue concerning the company. Essentially, only the company
may sue for the enforcement of the rights of the company. Therefore, pursuant to the proper
party principle, the company and not shareholders are the proper complainants against
those who harm the company.274 However, there are exceptions that permit shareholders to
file claims against wrongdoers. As Chen points out, those exceptions are limited and will
only permit a derivative claim in unusual circumstances.275
These exceptions arise out of the fact that shareholders suffer some degree of loss
when a company is harmed by the actions of a third party. However, the shareholders’
losses are “reflective” as opposed to “direct”.276 As previously discussed, concentrated
ownership can open the door for the company’s failure to pursue misdeeds against the
company. This is particularly possible when the majority shareholder, or shareholders are
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also in control of the company and commit the malfeasance against the best interest of the
company. The minority shareholders will have to take the initiative to enforce the
company’s rights when the company, under the control of the majority shareholders refuse
to do so.
The reason for the derivative suit in the US is based on the understanding that those
who are in charge of the company are usually the ones who commit the wrong against the
company and end up with a profit in the process.277 Therefore, at the end of the day,
someone else must have the authority to take action on behalf of the company. The
availability of the derivative suit is necessary for providing those in charge with the
motivation to act ethically and in the best interest of the company.278
At the same time, the availability of the derivative suit facilitates some important
principles of CSR. These principles include transparency, accountability and honesty/good
faith. Yet, the availability of the derivative suit must also be curtailed so that it does not
become a vehicle for trivial suits against a company which in essence will only slow the
company’s growth and progress as it will unnecessarily interrupt business. Another concern
is that easy access to derivative claims can also stifle the commitment of directors.
Therefore, important limitations on derivative claims are necessary. These limitations are
also important and considered in the US.
In order to understand the limited circumstances in which shareholders can bypass
the proper party principle in the US it is necessary to explore the theoretical explanation.
According to Garth, Nagel and Plager, the derivative suit in the US arose out of a need to
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place checks and balances on management when there is a separation between ownership
and control of the company.279 When ownership and management are separated a fiduciary
relationship is formed. Under the fiduciary relationship, the shareholders must be able to
trust management. The right to derivative action is a method by which shareholders can
hold management accountable to their fiduciary roles.280
Thus, in the US, the derivative claim is only available when the company has
suffered harm. The action is not available for preventing harm. Essentially, the derivative
claim arises when harm has accrued to the firm’s reputation due to fraudulent or other like
behaviour that causes “the market to lose trust in the corporation, resulting in increased
cost of capital for the corporation,” and the “loss is derivative because it affects the
corporation as a whole and affects all stockholders in the same way.”281
In other words, the harm caused to the company may not be personal. This
requirement will obviously act as a safeguard against frivolous claims and will therefore
keep the flood gates closed. In the short- and long-term, the circumstances under which
claims can be made on behalf of the company by minority shareholders are rare. At the
same time, the derivative claim acts as an oversight over management and will function to
solve some complicated agency problems within the corporation.
The agency problems are solved because the derivative claim in the US must
involve malfeasance by those in charge of the company. Specifically, there has to be an
actual fiduciary breach by management. This is known as the Caremark Claim which in
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essence permits a derivative claim in circumstances where a breach of fiduciary duty by
directors caused harm to the company.282
In other words, in the US, a derivative claim is only possible where it is established
that there was a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors/management and that the breach
of fiduciary duty caused the company harm. What this means is that minority shareholders
may not litigate action on behalf of the company in respect of foreseeable harm to the
company. This kind of limitation is an important safeguard against excessive oversight and
stifling management decision making. If derivative suits are permitted on the basis of
anticipated harm, the company can be shut down on a whim. Directors would feel too
pressured to make important business decisions. Therefore, these kinds of limitation such
as an actual harm and a breach of fiduciary duties are important for facilitating management
flexibility and for preventing the unnecessary interruption in the company’s business
activities.
In the Caremark case, two members of the board of Caremark, a healthcare
provider were indicted for healthcare contracts that included unlawful payouts. Still the
court ruled that the directors did act in good faith as they restructured management when
the company came under investigation, appointed an ethic’s committee and had adequate
protocols in place for monitoring information related to the contracts in question. There
was essentially, no reasons for the directors to be suspicious of the unlawful payouts under
the contracts.283
The Caremark case establishes important guidance against frivolous claims while
at the same time, facilitating the derivative claim. What this means is that while directors’
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decisions may cause the company harm, it may not have resulted in profits for the directors
and may not have been the result of deliberate action by the directors. Where directors act
in good faith with nothing but good intentions for the company, but the business deal or
transaction is spoiled by the malfeasance of others, the directors are not liable for the harm
to the company. This kind of safety net for directors acting in good faith is important
because while it is important to ensure that directors are pressured to act ethically and in
good faith, it is also important to ensure that directors do not feel limited in their discretion.
It is important to point out that in the US, the derivative claim is different from a
direct claim which opens up another avenue for shareholders seeking a remedy against
directors for harm. The direct claim allows any shareholder to file a suit for damages
against director. The direct claim is like any other civil claim and is not held to the
limitations placed on derivative claims. Moreover, if a settlement is negotiated under the
direct claim, it does not require the court’s approval. A derivative claim which results in a
settlement requires court approval. Any award of damages in a direct claim goes to the
shareholder. Under the derivative claim, the award of damages goes to the company.284
Thus, in the US, a direct claim against directors is a personal claim and a derivative claim
is representative of the company itself.
In Tooley v Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. settled the law on distinguishing
between a direct and derivative claim. Previously, it was held that a lawsuit is derivative if
the claim had an equal consequence for all shareholders.285 In the Tooley case, the Supreme
Court of Delaware explained that this test was erroneous and that there were two steps for
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determining whether a claim is a direct or derivative cause of action. First it was necessary
to determine who incurred damages: the shareholder or the company. Secondly, it must be
determined who the beneficiary of an award of damages is: again, the shareholder or the
company.286
Therefore, when seeking to bring a derivative claim, the claimant must first satisfy
the Tooley inquiry before even evaluating the fiduciary duty claims. Essentially, the
claimant must first be able to claim that the company was harmed by the directors’ actions
and secondly, it is the company that would recover damages. Those harms must then be
linked to a breach of fiduciary duty by directors. In other words, even if the claimant is
able to show that the company suffered harm due to a breach of a director’s fiduciary duty,
the derivative claim is not possible if the claimant cannot prove that the company will
actually recover the damages sought.
Although the Tooley inquiry was established by the Delaware Supreme Court it has
been applied in other prominent states. For example, in the appellate division of New York
adopted the Tooley inquiry in Yudell v Gilbert. In addition to adopting the Tooley inquiry,
the appellate division of New York also ruled that the distinction between direct and
derivative claims is important because directors owe a fiduciary duty to both shareholders
and the company. 287
In addition to establishing that a claim is appropriately a derivative suit as opposed
to a direct suit and that the action is based on a breach of directors’ fiduciary duty, the
claimant must satisfy a number of procedural requirements. The purpose of the procedural
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rules for commencing a derivative claim is to establish that it is the company that should
have control over the case.288
The procedural rules for commencing a derivative claim are contained in Rule 23.1
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). There are three parts to Rule 23.1. In the
first part of the act, the prerequisite factors are established. This is followed by the
pleadings. The final part of Rule 23.1 is the settlement part.289 The prerequisite establishes
that derivative claim may be brought when “one or more shareholders or members” of a
company or association bring action for enforcing a right that the company is free to claim
but has “failed to enforce”.290 In other words there is no minimum shareholding
requirement. The prerequisites rule goes further to state that "the derivative action may not
be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the
interest of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association".291
The second part of Rule 23.1 is in relation to pleadings. When an individual or
individuals file a claim for a derivative action, they must show that they are either a member
or shareholder at the relevant time or that their shareholding or “membership devolved”
merely “by operation of law”.292 The pleadings must also reveal that the claim is not a
result of collusion calculated to obtain jurisdiction that the court would not ordinarily have.
The pleadings must also specify previous attempts by the claimant or claimants to modify
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the defendant’s activities or power and “the reasons for not obtaining the action or not
making the effort”. 293
The final part of Rule 23.1 states that a derivative claim will not be “settled,
voluntarily dismissed or compromised” without first obtaining permission by the court.294
In other words, once a litigant commences a derivative claim it remains within the control
of the court. The parties have basically ceded the company’s future to the court. This may
be seen as a discouragement for seeking a derivative claim. At the same time, it can be seen
a s management concept that discourages mismanagement for fear of ceding control of the
company to the courts.
The American Bar Association Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) also
provides derivative suit procedures. Under the MBCA shareholders are required to serve a
demand for action on the board who may accept or deny the demand.295
However, there is an exception when the request is futile. The request will be
considered futile if the shareholder is suing the entire board of directors or the board is not
independent. In this case, the shareholder will be allowed to file the suit, and the court will
return the case to the company to evaluate shareholders' request by an independent
committee. After the committee gave its decision, the court will look two things, is the
board independent and acted in good faith or not. If the case found the rejection was issued
by an independent committee and they acted in good faith, the derivative suit filed by the
shareholders will be rejected296.
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Thus far, the US approach to the derivative claim has what might be considered the
best practice in its extension of the right to claims by both shareholders and members of
the corporation. Where foreign investors are responsible for the company’s incorporation
and are registered as members and not shareholders, they will have a right to pursue a
derivative claim. Moreover, the fiduciary duty and the standards for establishing it within
the realm of the US’s derivative suit holds out a management concept that is entirely
suitable to foreign investors who are not actively involved in the company and must trust
directors to manage their assets under the company.
Although remote shareholders such foreign investors have to overcome the direct
and derivative claim inquiry in the US, the breach of a fiduciary duty as a justification for
pursing a derivative claim is appealing. As a foreign investor with shares in a company,
the foreign investor will feel more comfortable knowing that he or she can file a derivative
claim when the directors running their company are held to a fiduciary duty and when they
breach this duty they are accountable to the company via shareholder derivative suit and to
individual shareholders directly.

4.3 Derivative Suit in Europe (UK, Germany, France)
4.3.1 The UK

The decision in Foss and Harbottle which was decided in 1843 established the
common law rule that only the company itself could pursue a claim against offending
directors/management.297 There were basically two exceptions to the rule: the wrongdoing
had to be incapable of ratification and all shareholders’ consent for the claim was necessary
only if the wrongdoer did not control the company.298
297
298
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The first exception is fair enough in that the action giving way to a derivative claim
is not action that would have been approved. However, the likelihood of disapproval must
be certain. This will require hypothetical projections. This means that it will be difficult to
prove that the action would not have been ratified. This is especially so where ownership
is concentrated and minority shareholders are usually absent or appoint majority
shareholders as proxies to vote on their behalf.
The second exception is difficult to accept as it requires that the action complained
of necessitated all shareholders’ approval if the offending party was not in control of the
company. This leaves open the question of where the derivative claim stands when the
offending party was in control of the company and necessitated all shareholders’ approval.
Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, both the Law Commission and the Company Law
Reform Steering Group made very similar observations and recommendations reflecting
these two exceptions for reforming the right of shareholders to initiate a derivative claim.
The recommendations were incorporated by Sections 260-264 of the Companies Act
2006.299
Section 260 of the 2006 Act defines a derivative claim as an action that is “vested
in the company” and seeks “relief on behalf of the company.”300The obvious theme which
is followed in the US is that actions taken on behalf of the company must be exactly what
it claims to be: on behalf of the company and for the company’s benefit. Section 260 also
establishes that derivative claims can only be filed under the Companies Act 2006 or
pursuant to a court order in “proceedings under section 994” which deals with “proceedings

299
300

Id.
Companies Act 2006, s. 260 (1) (a) and (b).

94

for the protection of members against unfair prejudice”.301 Therefore, in addition to seeking
relief under grounds available in the Company Act, Sections 260-264, shareholders may
seek relief under unfair prejudice rules pursuant to Section 994 of the 2006 Act.
Under Section 260(3), derivative claims may be filed when a "…cause of action
gives rise to an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust by a director of the company".302 Thus, unlike in the US the right to
file a derivative claim is not absolutely reactive. The derivative claim can be filed in
anticipation of a wrongful act. The problem with anticipatory breach is that it basically
places directors under unnecessary scrutiny which can make it difficult for innocent, loyal
and committed directors to exercise the business flexibility necessary to reap returns for
the company. In addition, this kind of rule also makes it possible for the courts’ dockets to
become inundated with derivative claims.
The actionable behaviour must be from a director. This adds another layer of
complexity to the right to file derivative claims. The complexity arises because if a nondirector commits a harmful act, it will have to be tied to a breach of directors’ duties. This
makes it difficult to sustain an action against third parties who might commit a wrong or
who have already committed a wrong against the company and had no real inside control
of the company.
Unlike in the US, the Companies Act of the UK it does not matter if the member
filing or continuing the derivative claim was a member of the company before or after the
cause of action accrued.303Pursuant to Section 112 (1), a member of the company is a
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subscriber to the company who is registered with company’s registry and any other
individual who is registered on the company’s registry as a member.304 Moreover, members
of the company are shareholders who have acquired shares via “operation of law”.305 Like
the US however, a UK shareholder is not required to hold a specific amount of shares to be
entitled to file a derivative claim.
Section 261 establishes that when a derivative claim is filed, the complaint/s must
obtain the court’s permission to be allowed to continue the action. In order to obtain the
court’s permission, the claimant/claimants must prove to the satisfaction of the court that
there is a prima facie case. The court may in turn, dismiss the claim if it finds that there is
no prima facie case or may permit continuance if a prima facie case is established.306
Section 262 applies only to cases where leave is sought to continue a derivative
claim when companies have filed claims and the cause of action under the claim falls under
the realm of derivative claims.307 Members of the company can apply for leave to continue
a claim as a derivative claim on three grounds. The first ground is that the member/s
seeking to continue the claim can satisfy the court that the “manner in which the company
commenced or continued the clam amounts to an abuse of the process of the court”.308
Secondly, the party seeking to continue the claim as a derivative suit must also prove to the
court that the company has not prosecuted the claim in a diligent manner. Finally, the party
seeking to continue the claim as a derivative suit must satisfy the court that it is “appropriate
for the member to continue the claim as a derivative claim”.309
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Under Section 262, the party seeking to continue a claim filed by a company as a
derivative suit must also establish a prima facie case in order to proceed.310 As with
members filing a request to continue their own derivative suits, members seeking to
continue a company’s claim as a derivative suit will have the same options. The options
are subject to the court’s discretion which include the authority to dismiss the request for
continuance, or grant it or to make recommendations for moving forward.311
Section 263 provides guidance for courts when confronted with an application for
continuing a derivative suit. The court is required to decline an application for continuing
a derivative claim if an individual who has a Section 172 duty to “promote the success of
the company” would not “seek to continue the claim”.312This is a very difficult ground to
substantiate because it requires making assumptions about how an individual who is
responsible for promoting the success of the company would act. Again, this appears to be
related to directors’ duties. Since a derivative claim is against directors it is difficult to
imagine how a member of the company will succeed in proving that directors against whom
the claim is targeting would support that derivative claim because it goes against the idea
of promoting the success of the company.
Thankfully there are other grounds upon which the court may refuse the continuing
of a derivative claim. Under the second ground, the court may rule against continuing a
derivative claim if the cause of action is related to something that has not yet happened and
has the company’s approval. Finally, the court must also decline the application for
continuing a derivative claim when the cause of action is linked to something that has taken
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place and was approved by the company prior to it taking place or was “ratified by the
company” after it happened.313
When determining if leave should be granted to continue a derivative claim, the
court is required to take into consideration if the members seeking continuance is “acting
in good faith”.314 The court must also consider the significance that an individual with a
duty to promote the company’s success would place on continuing the derivative claim.
The court must also take into consideration whether the act or omission would have been
approved by the company prior to its occurrence or ratified by the company after it
happened.315
In determining whether to grant permission to continue with a derivative claim, the
court must also take into consideration whether the cause of action is linked to something
that has taken place already, if an act or omission would have been ratified by the
corporation and if the company the decision to withdraw from the claim. The court must
also consider whether the claim is such that the member seeking to continue it can file a
personal claim as opposed to a claim for the company.316In deciding whether to grant leave
to continue a derivative claim, the court will also take into account the perspectives of those
members of the company that do not have a vested interest in the claim.317
Section 263 also confers authority on the Secretary of State to pass regulations for
amending Section 263(2) and (3).318 In other words, the Secretary of State may add to or
detract from the grounds upon which the court may refuse or grant permission to continue
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a claim as a derivative suit. Therefore, the grounds upon which a court may grant or refuse
permission to continue a derivative claim are not fixed as they are subject to change at any
time.
Section 264 provides that when a member of the company files a derivative claim
or continues a derivative claim, another member can make an application for permission
to continue the claim on three grounds. First the member seeking to continue the claim
filed or continued by another member must prove that the action was proceeded or
continued in ways that are tantamount to an abuse of the court’s process.319Secondly, the
member must also satisfy the court that the initial claim was not proceed with
“diligently”.320Finally, the member must also prove that “it is appropriate for the applicant
to continue the claim as a derivative claim”.321
As with any derivative claim, when a member seeks to continue or proceed with a
derivative claim brought by another member, the court will consider whether there is a
prima facie case. If the court considers that there is no prima facie case, the member’s
application to proceed will be dismissed.322The court also has the option to make an order
requesting evidence and in the mean time adjourn the case to allow time for the collection
and presentation of the evidence.323
The UK’s approach to the derivative claim is more about protecting the company’s
right to self-management.324 Any interjection into the management of a company in the UK
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can only be justified on exceptional grounds.325 This is obviously the position taken by the
UK’s Companies Act 2006 which establishes the limits to a derivative claim by
shareholders. Essentially, the 2006 Companies Act creates a vetting system so that a
derivative claim cannot be brought without first obtaining the court’s permission. This
vetting system has worked so far to limit the amount of claims that have been put forward.
Since the implementation of the 2006 Act and up to the year 2015, just over 20 actions
have proceeded on the basis of a derivative suit. According to Keay, this may because many
shareholders prefer to proceed under the Companies Act 2006 unfair prejudice provision.326
The cost for proceeding with a derivative claim is high with an indirect payoff to
the shareholder. This is because, any reward for damages goes to the company. When one
considers the cost of litigation and the low return on shares for minority shareholders of a
company that has suffered damages, the motivation for going through the arduous process
of a derivative claim under the Companies Act 2006 in the UK is discouraging. This is
perhaps why shareholders will take the cost risk on the unfair prejudice proceedings since
any award of damages against the directors will go directly to the shareholders.
In other words, in the UK minority shareholders have the alternative remedy in
pursuing the directors for unfair prejudice. When taking this approach, shareholders are not
required to go through a vetting process. Therefore, with this less arduous legal option for
remedies against directors, it is hardly surprising that UK shareholders have shied away
from the derivative suit and turned toward the unfair prejudice option under the Companies
Act 2006. Moreover, the ruling in Franbar Holding v Patel indicates that the courts in the
UK are reluctant to grant permission to proceed with or continue a derivative claim if it is
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satisfied that another remedy such as the unfair prejudice option is available in the
circumstances of the case.327
4.3.2 Germany

Germany’s Aktiengesetz does not specifically refer to derivative claims, but
paragraphs 147 – 148 does make remedial provisions for shareholders although
shareholders seeking to pursue an action alone must have a certain amount of shares.328
Paragraphs 147 and 148 provide for shareholders to bring action against directors, founders
and board executives who have damaged the company.329
Like the US and unlike in the UK, the action can only be brought in cases where
damages have already occurred. A derivative suit will not be allowed where damages are
anticipated. By permitting a derivative claim in respect of anticipatory breaches,
shareholders are expected to excessively scrutinize management and this can be entirely
problematic for agency issues. Where the company is family owned and operated, one can
expect greater secrecy if minority shareholders are entitled to file a derivative claim on the
basis of anticipatory damages. Family owned and operated business are already
predisposed to operate in secrecy. The fear of minority shareholders taking these owners to
court on behalf of a family company will only ensure that these owners undermine
transparency and operate in even greater secrecy.
Pursuant to Paragraph 147(1) and (2) under the Aktiengesetz, a majority vote at a
general meeting is required to “appoint special representatives for the purpose of bringing
a claim for damages” against members of the board or the founders of the company who
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are culpable.330 This is entirely problematic in the concentrated ownership structures of
most companies, especially family owned companies. The majority shareholders can cast
a vote in favour of bypassing action and the minority shareholders who are present are
powerless to overpower the majority shareholders. Fortunately, Paragraph 136 excludes
those suspected of committing the wrong from participating in the vote. The special
representatives must file the action within six months of the vote. Moreover, the special
representatives must consist of board members and/or the founders of the company.331
Again Paragraph 136 presents difficulties for the company in which the majority
shareholders are the founders of the company. Within the family owned business the
majority shareholders are likely to be the founders of the company. The founders and/or
majority shareholders are likely to be involved in the malfeasance that causes the company
actual loss. To appoint this class of individuals as special representatives in a derivative
claim is tantamount to creating a conflict of interests.
This is an obvious discouragement for those seeking to sue members of the board
or founders. Agency problems are obviously involved in this choice of action against a
company. It is therefore hardly surprising that the provisions of Paragraph 147 have been
described as “unduly restrictive”.332 In 2005, paragraph 148 was added to the Aktiengesetz
which permits shareholders to sue board members or founders. However, similar to the
proceedings for a derivative claim in the UK, the shareholders in Germany must go through
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a pre-trial process for approval before the courts.333 In addition, a shareholder may only
commence an action if he or she owns 1/100th shares in the company.334
Shareholders in Germany qualifying for suing board members or founders must
prove that they owned the shares prior to the publicized damages to the company. The
shareholder must also prove that the company was under a duty to commence action in
respect of the malfeasance giving rise to the damages by a certain time and that the damages
per se were due to a breach of board or founders’ duties.335 If permission is granted to
proceed with the claim, the claimants will have 90 days to proceed and must do so in the
court where permission was granted.336
The German law for permitting what is similar to a derivative claim is not as
imposing and restrictive as that of the UK. However, the ceiling on shareholding puts some
shareholders out of the realm of protection in Germany. Therefore, while it may be easier
on the basis of law to proceed with action against management in Germany, it is more
restrictive as to who has the right to challenge management in German company.
4.3.3 France

Unlike Germany where derivative claims are collective actions, French law permits
shareholders to bring action against directors for the company under a derivative claim also
known as “action sociale ut singuli”.337 The derivative suit may be filed for cases of poor
management on the part of directors or an executive officer provided the activities
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complained of caused the company damages. Such a suit is permitted unless the company
itself has filed a complaint.338
Poor management on the part of directors or executives is too vague to foster
confidence in minority shareholders’ right to file a derivative suit on behalf of the company.
Other jurisdictions such as the US and the UK emphasise a breach of director’s duties or
fiduciary duties. These duties are well documented by case law and statutes. Poor
management on the other hand is open to interpretation and can mean virtually anything
from picking a terrible color for painting the office and appointing a poorly qualified
painter to taking an excessive business risk. Both will cost the company damages. The
problem is in determining which wrong is wilful enough to permit a derivative claim.
Similar to Germany, France has some shareholding limitations on who can file a
suit on behalf of the company. In France, shareholders with no less than 5% of the
company’s shares are permitted to file a derivative suit. This limitation on shareholding
drives some shareholders from the judgment seat. This goes against corporate governance
principles that emphasize equal and fair treatment of all shareholders.
The shareholders filing the derivative suit must appoint at least one representative
to file the derivative suit. Moreover, companies with listed shares on the New York Stock
Exchange Euronext Paris, can have a derivative suit filed by a “shareholders’
association”.339 In the event the derivative suit results in an award of damages, the damages
are paid to the company rather than the shareholders.340 This requirement appears to be
universal and is not special to any one jurisdiction.
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Derivative claims are not new to France. The derivative suit has been around in
France since 1867 with Germany following in nearly 20 years later in 1884. At this time,
the derivative suit is enabled by France’s Code De Commerce. The Code De Commerce
merely states that a shareholder or shareholders may sue directors and other officers on
behalf of the company. Ultimately, the derivative claim is perceived by the French law to
be a shareholder right.341
Still, in France, “groups of shareholders and shareholder associations” are required
to “pass thresholds to bring joint suits".342 These kinds of challenges explain why derivative
claims are rare in Europe. Moreover, while other jurisdictions such as the UK and Germany
have laws in place that permit the shareholder filing the suit to receive an award for legal
fees if they are successful in court, France an award for legal costs is very limited. While
the court can make an award for legal costs, the award in France is limited to administrative
fees while attorney costs are not usually awarded.343
In addition to permitting shareholders and shareholder associations to seek
derivative claims against companies, the French Civil Procedure law permits all relevant
parties which includes minority shareholders to apply via an ex parte application for the
production of evidence that is useful for possible litigation. However, the ex parte
application must be filed prior to the litigation.344
French law also permits and empowers courts to interfere so as to replace directors
when it is apparent that the company is about to suffer serious harm.345 The courts’ power
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to intervene in the company to appoint directors is the exception and not the rule. This
course of action may only happen in very extraordinary circumstances. Moreover, this
course of action is not meant for the protection of minority shareholders but rather for the
company as a whole in very unusual cases.346
Under the French Commercial Code, shareholders with a combined 5% of the
company’s shares and minority shareholder associations are at liberty to write to the board’s
president inquiring about decisions made by managers. If the inquiring shareholders to not
receive a reasonable response within 30 days, the inquiring shareholders can apply to the
court for the appointment of a neutral party to look into the issue.347
Where shareholders with an accumulated 10% of the company’s share want to
question management decision they too may apply to the court for the appointment of a
neutral party. However, this category of shareholders are not required to first write to the
President of the Board and wait one month for a response. This category of shareholders
are permitted to go directly to the courts.348 If the neutral third party is appointed by the
court, a report will be published and annexed to the report by the auditor and presented at
the next shareholders’ meeting.349
Ultimately, shareholders in France may proceed against directors individually or on
behalf of the company via derivative claims. When the latter is sought, it is an attempt to
recover losses sustained by the company. These claims are only permitted where the
directors in question have broken the law, or breached the articles of association or
committed poor management offences. Shareholder may also seek criminal penalties
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especially in cases where directors have misused the company’s assets, abused power,
misdirected dividends and publishes erroneous account statements. In such a case, the
action can be commenced by any injured party, but the remedy is sought before a judge
sitting in a criminal court.350
The law permitting the filing of a derivative claim in France is virtually the same
as in Germany and the UK where derivative claims appear to be the action of last resort. In
the UK there is a vetting system which is essentially missing in Germany and France. Yet,
the limited and complex nature of facilitating laws makes it just as difficult for individual
shareholders to pursue derivative claims.

4.4 Asia (Japan and China)
The theoretical assumption that Asian culture is far from litigious and that the
derivative claim is more suited to the litigious west than Asians, is challenged by an
ongoing reality. This ongoing reality has revealed that increasingly, Asia’s largest
economies are not become frequent and serious subscribers to the notion of derivative
action.351 This is surprising considering, China, Asia’s largest economy has only just
introduced the derivative claim for the first time in 2005.352 This part of the chapter will
analyse and describe derivative claims in China and Japan.
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4.4.1 China
Since the introduction of derivative claims to China in 2005, the derivative claim

has been very rarely used. In fact, there is only evidence of one such claim being filed in
China. It is believed that the threshold of 1% of the company’s shares as a vetting
mechanism is unfair. However, screening the merits of the case as is the case in the UK is
not compatible with the reality in China. At this time, there is widespread corruption in
China’s judiciary.353 Therefore, screening derivative claims through establishing a
minimum shareholding requirement is best suited to China.
The fact that only one derivative claim has been filed in China since it became
available under the new Company Law in 2005 is a not a testament to good corporate
governance and shareholder protection.354 Media reports indicate that the opposite is true.
Media reports reveal that abuse of power and company malfeasance is a constant problem
in China. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that minority shareholder protection
remains a significant difficulty.355
Since foreign companies are opening offices and carrying on businesses in China
one might surmise that the lack of derivative claims does not appear to be a deterrence to
foreign investors. However, it is important to bear in mind that these foreign companies
generally have majority shareholding or are in joint ventures with Chinese companies or
owners. In Saudi Arabia, many of the foreign directors will be minority shareholders and
as a result, the derivative claim is going to be very important to them.
The question that looms is why shareholders in China are failing to utilize the new
Company Law’s provision for derivative claim. To begin with the 1% minimum
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shareholding requirement puts a majority of shareholders out of the judgment seat. This is
because it is rare for a shareholder in a Chinese company to own 1% of the company’s
shares. As a result, individual shareholders are in reality, not qualified to file a derivative
claim in China.356
The only alternative is the “permission procedure” such as the procedure used in
the UK and other common law jurisdictions.357 The problem in China is that judges are not
well-trained individuals. This is problematic because legislators will typically confer upon
the judiciary a broad discretion as to when a derivative claim should be admitted. Another
problem is that judges in China are susceptible to political intrusions. Therefore, it is
“doubtful that judges can exercise sound discretion and handle such complex cases
effectively.”358 Consequentially, derivative claims are not capable of providing minority
shareholders with sufficient protection in China.
Minority shareholders in China are at a disadvantage because most companies in
China are controlled by the State.359 While there is political control in the judiciary, there
is also political control within the company. China’s majority shareholders are therefore
different from those in common law jurisdictions and this puts an interesting twist on
agency problems. In common law jurisdictions, majority shareholders are more concerned
about the maximization of shareholder wealth. In China’s companies, majority
shareholders which are the state are more concerned with pursuing government goals and
political ambitions.360
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It therefore follows that when a derivative suit is filed it becomes a very tense
source of litigation. The political dimensions of the claim will automatically create tensions
for the judiciary who will have a very difficult time accepting a derivative claim.361
Moreover, when the majority shareholders are the state and is the defendant, it is difficult
to imagine the court approving the action and ruling against the state.
According to Huang, the introduction of the derivative claim into the legislation of
China was not really an improvement of the law as it previously existed. The statutory
provision for the derivative claim is generalized to the point that the rights of shareholders
are not altogether clear.362 Under Article 150 of the new Company Law, a derivative claim
exists where someone in a managerial position violates the articles of association, the law,
or regulations. In such a case, the action must be such that the company would respond by
taking the offender to court. When the company fails to take the necessary action, a
derivative suit is available.363
Like France, in order to bring a derivative claim in China, Article 152 of the new
Company law requires that the shareholder first make a request of the board of directors.
As a result the shareholder seeking to file a derivative claim may only do so after making
serious attempts to deal with the matter internally. 364 The reason for this rule is to allow
the company’s executives to identify and utilize an opportunity to deal with a recognized
problem within the organization. This is preferable to putting the company’s internal
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problems on public display. Moreover, if an internal resolution is possible, it will also save
the company the expense involved in litigation.365
It can be an admirable requirement for companies to seek an internal solution to a
problem that qualifies for derivative action. However, the difficulty here is that the majority
shareholders who control the company are likely to be the wrongdoers and unlikely to seek
an authentic internal solution to a problem.
Essentially, the derivative claim in China is legislated to validate the idea that the
right to sue anyone who harms the company belongs to the company itself. This is the
same position taken in other jurisdictions. When the company fails to take the appropriate
action, the derivative claim as legislated in China and elsewhere then provides guidelines
and exceptions that will allow shareholders to proceed with action on behalf of the
company. What China’s statutory provisions fails to do, is to provide a means by which it
can or should be established that the shareholder’s interest in the damages to the company
is personal or not. Therefore, the standards and barriers for pursuing a derivative claim
under the Chinese Company Law is not altogether clear.
4.4.2 Japan

Japan is obviously not a stranger to derivative claims. The country has a long, but
unstable history of derivative actions. The litigation climate in derivative claims have been
up and down over the years. In other words, Japan has tried and tested laws regulating
derivative claims but have said very little about these laws.
Derivative suits began in Japan in 1950 and over a 40-year period only ten cases
were heard by the courts. An economic bubble and a number of company scandals took
365
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place. These scandals were unlawful compensation losses, unlawful benefits, bribes and
unlawful bidding. In 1993 corporate law reforms were aimed at eliminating unlawful
transactions and improving the shareholders’ ability to hold management accountable.366
This was obviously a very good move as it pushes Japanese companies to at least attempt
to work with.
The laws regulating derivative claims in Japan have been revised and “liberalized
significantly over the past twenty years”.367 Japan started revision of its company law in
1992 and the revisions were included in the new Companies Law 2006.368 The new
Company Law introduced significant changes to the derivative suit in Japan. For Japan,
the changes in the derivative suit has led to some important court triumphs for shareholders
seeking redress for their respective companies against mismanagement.369
During the 1990s, Japanese shareholders showed an increased predisposition for
lodging derivative suits. The rationale for this increase in derivative suits by Japanese
shareholders was that the Japanese shareholder was motivated by economics and they were
“rational”.370 In other words, Japanese shareholders were concerned with their economic
benefits and rationalized that they needed to protect the company that they hold shares in.
According to Goto, Japan’s corporate law has among the world’s strongest
protection for its companies’ shareholders. Many of the protections fall under the realm of
those items that have been advocated for repeatedly over the years. These rights include
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the authority of shareholders for changing the charter of the company without first having
to obtain the permission of the board; the assertion of control over how and when dividends
are paid; voting on boards, the authority to change the board of directors and so on.371
Moreover, the derivative suit is very easy to be initiated and just as simple to keep going372
Goto argues that the protection for shareholders in Japan is much stronger than the
protection for shareholders in the US.373 The derivative suit in Japan commences with the
same principle as common law countries: the right to take action on behalf of the company
belongs to the company. Shareholder rights to pursue an action on behalf of the company
is an exception to this rule.374 Unlike other countries where the exception is treated on the
facts and circumstances of each case, Japan takes a “formalistic and categorical”
approach.375
The list of exceptions is long and includes those items that the company’s managers
are unlikely to take action on. Although constrained by the list of exceptions, Japanese
shareholders still confront less constraints than other shareholders. To begin with, the
Japanese shareholder is required to request that the directors file a suit on behalf of the
company. Failure to take action within two months of receiving the request permits the
shareholder making the request to file a suit on behalf of the company. What distinguishes
this request from most other jurisdiction is that the Japanese shareholder is not required to
prove that there was a failure by directors to respond to the request.376
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When the shareholder files a derivative suit, the court is not authorized to vacate
the suit on the grounds that the company’s “special litigation committee” made a “decision”
on the matter raised.377 Moreover, a shareholder is only required to hold at least one share
for six months prior to the accrual of the action to file a derivative suit.378 This is very
different from other Jurisdictions such as France, Germany and China where a shareholder
is required to own a substantial amount of shares to file a derivative suit.
Goto explains that in Japan there is “no fair and adequate representation
requirement” although the court will vacate a derivative suit if it turns out that the
shareholder is motivated to achieve an arbitrary benefit or seeks to cause the company
harm.379 Thus, a derivative suit in Japan is relatively easy to file and more difficult to
vacate.380
In 1993, the Commercial Code of Japan was amended to relax the restrictions for
filing a derivative suit. There were two significant amendments. First, the cost of filing a
derivative suit was lowered to a fixed amount that applied to all suites regardless of the
size of the award sought by the claimant. Secondly, shareholders who filed a derivative suit
were permitted to recover costs so that the award of damages were not strictly for the
company. These amendments increased the number of derivative suits filed in Japan.381
The increase in derivative suit also corresponded with a large number of frivolous
claims. As a result, the Commercial Code was amended again in 2001. There were four
important amendments. First, with the approval of all company shareholders directors
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could escape some liability. Secondly, with approval of auditors, a stock company were
permitted to become involved in a suit in aid of management. Thirdly, conciliatory
proceedings were easier to establish. Fourthly, the shareholder filing a derivative suit is
required to notify the respondents prior to filing the suit.382
Japan’s Companies Act 2006 made further changes to the derivative suit by
shareholders. The 2006 Act lifted prohibition which prevented a holding company filing a
derivative suit against management in its subsidiary companies. The prohibition was
waived by a provision in the 2006 Act that allows a shareholder in a parent company to file
a derivative suit against a subsidiary or its directors. The derivative suit is only available if
the subsidiary contributes one-fifth of the parent company’s asset value. Moreover, the
shareholder seeking to file the derivative claim is required to own at least 1% of the parent
company’s shares.383
The 2006 Companies Act introduced a new constraint on the filing of a derivative
suit in Japan. The new constraint requires an examination of the outcome of a case. This is
because a derivative suit will not be permitted if it can be shown that it will cause serious
harm to the company.384 This new restriction introduces a unique requirement. The court
is not merely required to look at the harm the malfeasance cost the company, but also the
harm that the derivative claim will bring to the company. This can mean that virtually any
derivative claim can be dismissed on the grounds that it can bring about significant harm
to the company’s reputation and therefore profits.
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Another change involved the auditor as a defendant to a derivative suit. Previously,
the auditor was not a permitted defendant to a derivative suit. However, under the 2006
Companies Act, shareholders filing a derivative suit are now free to sue the company’s
auditor either jointly or alone.385 The grounds upon which an auditor may be sued on behalf
of the company are unknown. The effect this exception might have on the relationship
between the auditor and the company is problematic. Trust and confidence can be destroyed
on the part of both parties.
The persistent filing of derivative suits over the years in Japan not only lead to
amendments of law impacting the parameters of derivative action, but also led to more
detailed explanations of what a director’s responsibilities are. The greater details have been
expanded on by the court. Statutory amendments, together with rulings in derivative suits
have helped to create guide for corporate management in relation to what is appropriate
conduct on the part of directors in terms of their relationship with the company and with
the shareholders of the company.386
Japan appears to have adopted an approach to derivative claims that are very
different from other jurisdictions’ approach. While other jurisdictions appear to either
attempt to balance management by shareholders and accountability to shareholders with
the preservation of the company’s integrity in self-management, Japan focuses more
shareholder management and accountability to shareholders. This approach to derivative
claims explains why it is less expensive to file a derivative claim in Japan and why
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shareholders filing the claim can recover some expenses. This approach also explains why
it is easier to file a derivative claim in Japan and why it is more difficult for the claim to be
dismissed or vacated by the court.

4.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examined comparative laws and practices for derivative claims in
other jurisdictions. The comparative jurisdictions examined were the US, Europe (the UK,
Germany and France), and Asia (Japan and China). The comparative jurisdictions are all
major economies in the global market. All of the countries examined are either developed
or developing economies. Therefore, the comparative jurisdictions have provided some
insight k how derivative suits can be regulated to achieve the goal of providing for
accountability to shareholders and oversight of the company’s management by
shareholders.
The main weakness observed in the comparative jurisdictions is the fact that the
derivative suit can only be filed in response to the harm caused by mismanagement. Only
in the UK can derivative suit be filed to prevent a suit. The major strength of the
comparative laws regulating derivative suits is that it does seek to prevent frivolous claims
through either a vetting procedure or through the regulation of standing. Standing is
typically established through the shareholder owning a certain percentage of the shares.
Japan’s approach appears to differ from the other jurisdictions studied. Japan’s
approach is to remove as many of the hurdles to derivative action as possible while at the
same time attempting to prevent an overflow of litigation. Japan therefore demonstrates
that lowering the boundaries to derivative suits is not the appropriate direction legislators
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will want to take. The mere lowering of cost was enough to inundate the courts’ dockets
with derivative claims, many of which were found to be frivolous.
In moving forward, it is necessary for legislators to think about the rights of
shareholders, especially the minority and remote shareholders. At the same time, legislators
need to think about the disruption to the company’s business and the effect of litigation
challenging management decisions. Ultimately, derivative claims are necessary. However,
if regulated poorly, derivative claims can be more harmful to the company. The US
derivative claim suit appears to have the best practice since there is no minimum
shareholding requirement and there is the appointment of the special litigation team which
permits the derivative claim to be settled by the company itself before proceeding with the
suit in court.
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Chapter 5:
Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes research findings in relation to the derivative suite in
Saudi Arabia’s company law and practice. Based on research findings as summarized, this
chapter will make recommendations for improvement of Saudi Arabia’s derivative suite
and generally for improved protection of shareholders, especially minority shareholders.
This chapter also provides recommendations for further research. Therefore, this final
chapter is divided into three main parts: summary, recommendations, and suggestions for
further research.

5.2 Summary
Research findings indicate that the derivative suite as a means for protecting
minority shareholders have been affecting company laws in developing countries. Saudi
Arabia has also seen changes, although its company laws have established some
limitations. For the most part, Saudi Arabia has been committed to ensuring that a
shareholder’s rights are only as good as his or her shareholding. This is reflected in the
distribution of voting rights and dividends. Therefore, in the grand scheme of things, when
it comes to derivative suites, minority shareholders who have limited voting rights and
dividends really lack the motivation to insist on, or utilize corporate governance standards
for transparency and accountability which are necessary for judging and enforcing
misconduct on the part of management and executives.
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Ultimately, Saudi Arabia has adopted a corporate governance structure that is
consistent with the standards and principals of international corporate governance.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has updated its company law. However, these collections of laws
and codes do not guarantee that the best practices are implemented and enforced for
promoting and safeguarding derivative suites.
Although agency theory is purported to be the most significant and relevant theory
for structuring corporate governance, it has an uneasy coexistence with Saudi corporations.
This is because agency theory, realistically accepts that in the division of management and
ownership, agency problems arise in companies. However, research findings reveal that a
majority of companies in Saudi Arabia are family owned or state owned. In these cases
owners usually also are the manager. Therefore, agency problems are more unique and
more difficult to resolve. Minority shareholders are also more remote and less involved in
the company.
Religion also plays a role in stunting the effectiveness of corporate governance
structures in Saudi Arabia where Sharia law is the primary source of law. Family owners
are very reluctant to permit minority shareholders any degree of control over the family. A
similar aversion is directed toward foreign investors. Religion is far less limiting in that
Sharia Law does require fair dealing and honesty from those in control. In fact, Sharia
Law promotes principles and standards reflected by the stakeholder theory of corporate
governance. Therefore, Saudi Arabia can implement and enforce the OECD and G20’s
corporate governance framework which is based on the stakeholder theory.
Still, research findings revealed that there are still some problems in Saudi Arabia.
The primary difficulty is that the CMA’s corporate governance framework is only
120

applicable to companies that are publicly listed. The difficulty here is that most of the more
successful companies in Saudi Arabia are family-owned and therefore not listed. Although
Sharia law is consistent with international standards of corporate governance, they are too
broad to apply to a corporate governance framework.
Although the Sharia Law speaks of honesty and good faith, it basically expects
minority shareholders to place their thrust in the majority ownership. By doing so, minority
shareholders are not specifically protected. The Companies Law 2015 which came into
force in 2016 seeks to improve on the protection of minority shareholders. The 2015
Companies Law applies to all companies whether publicly traded or not. This law
establishes some protections by describing powers and duties of directors and minority
shareholders' rights.
The most controversial article in the 2015 Companies Law is Article 79. This article
provides that minority shareholders can file derivative claims. However, this right may
only be exercised if the shareholder in question first obtains permission from the general
assembly and the relevant company directors. If such permission is not obtained, the
shareholder may file a tort or civil claim in his/her own name and at his/her own expense.
This is problematic because in family-owned companies where ownership and
management are usually the same or in a company with majority shareholders exist, the
general assembly is expected to be controlled by owners or majority shareholder who are
directors. Therefore, permission to file a derivative claim is not likely to occur. Therefore,
the fact that the only viable recourse is an expensive civil or tort claim will deter further
action against company directors.
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Moreover, there are other agency problems in the family-owned company that puts
up obstacles to a derivative claim. For instance, in order to file a derivative claim, the
claimant must establish that there is a link between the damages complained of the
company director/directors’ actions. However, this information must be obtained from the
individuals the minority shareholder wishes to file a derivative suite against.
Based on research findings, the protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia
is very important. This is because at this time, Saudi Arabia is determined to diversify its
economy to safeguard against the pitfalls of relying almost entirely on its oil reserves. In
order to diversify, Saudi Arabia recognizes the importance of attracting and sustaining
foreign investment. Invariably, this means that foreign investors will consist of many
minority shareholders who are remote.

Unless minority shareholders are protected

satisfactorily, foreign investment will be minimal.
At this point that most that can be said of Saudi Arabia’s derivative claim is that it
is not prohibited. However, it is very limited and difficult to pursue. There is a need for
greater protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia given its desire to diversify its
economy through the attraction of foreign investment. The extent to which shareholders
are protected in the host country will play a significant role in the host country’s appeal to
foreign investors.
In examining the laws and best practices for comparative derivative claims,
research findings indicate that the model used by the US is perhaps the most appropriate
for Saudi Arabia legal system. In the US, the derivative claim is only available when the
company has already suffered a loss and not for preventing damages. This is entirely
understandable because the law does favor giving companies autonomy.
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The Caremark Claim is the primary principle for pursuing a derivative claim in the
US. Under the Caremark Claim, a derivative claim is permissible where directors not only
contravene their fiduciary duties, but where the breach of fiduciary duties damaged the
company. This is rather comforting for foreign investors to know. For the most part, when
directors breach fiduciary duties and damage the company, they typically incur personal
gains. Therefore, the right to sue directors in these kinds of circumstances ensures that the
company can recover damages from those who damaged the company and acquired gains
in doing so.
This research discovered that in the US there are three procedural parts for the
derivative claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1. First, the
prerequisite requires that one or more shareholders can bring a claim where there is a right
that the company can claim but failed to do so. Therefore, there is no minimum
shareholding requirement. This is essentially what distinguishes the US derivative suite
from other jurisdictions.
The shareholder seeking to file a derivative claim must also satisfy the court that
the claim is representative of the rights and interest of other shareholder. Under the second
part of Rule 23.1, the shareholder filing a suite must prove that he or she was a shareholder
at the time in question. Moreover, the claimant must prove that they are not simply
attempting to establish standing for a matter that would not ordinarily fall under the court’s
jurisdiction. In addition, the claimant must establish that previous attempts were made to
resolve the issue or explain why such measures are not taken.
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Under the third part of Rule 23.1, the derivative claim cannot be dismissed, altered
or settled without the court’s permission. Therefore, once the claim is commenced the court
has full authority over what happens to the claim.
The American Bar Association also provides a model for the pursuit of a derivative
claim. Under this model the shareholder or shareholders are required to first make demands
of the board. If the board refuses to take action, the shareholders are free to file the
derivative claim. Once this happens, the board may if they desire, appoint a litigation
committee to counter the claim. Note that, the board is not called upon to approve the suit
and therefore may not control it.
In the US, the laws regulating the derivative claim ensures that minority
shareholders may file a derivative claim only when damages have occurred to the company
and those in charge fail to take action. This is fair enough considering that the rule
regarding the appropriate party. Secondly, the US gives the board an opportunity to take
action when the company suffers damages due to director malfeasance. When the
derivative claim is filed, the court is in control. Therefore, the US approach to derivative
claims was found to represent the best practice because it presents a fair balance between
the rights of the company and minority shareholders.
This is especially important for foreign investors who invest in domestic companies
and rely on partners and directors to safeguard their interests and investments. Knowing
that they are at liberty to file a derivative suit when the company they invested in suffers a
loss due to the egregious behavior of directors is an appealing concept.
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Research findings revealed that both common law and civil law countries have
implemented laws and practices that improve the right of minority shareholders to file
derivative claims. For instance, the UK which established the proper party rule in the rule
in Foss v. Harbottle, implemented the Companies Act 2006. Under the Companies Act
2006, minority shareholders may file claims on behalf of the company via derivative suites.
The allowable claims must be in relation to negligent or willful contravention of directors’
duties.
What separates the derivative suite in the UK from the US is the fact that a claim
may be filed in anticipation of damages to the company. As previously pointed out the
derivative suites is only available to US shareholders after damages have been sustained.
Still, in the UK, the behavior giving rise to a derivative claim must be that of a director.
This means that if an individual who is not a director commits or is about to commit a
malfeasance against the company, the derivative suit by a minority shareholder on behalf
of the company is not an option.
Still, the US remains the better model because in the UK, a shareholder may only
commence action via a derivative claim on behalf of the company if he or she holds a
specific number of shares in the company. Moreover, in the UK, the Companies Act 2006
provides rules and limitations that appears to unnecessarily places the claimant to a
derivative suite under significant scrutiny. For example, the court’s approval is needed to
pursue and continue a derivative suit. In order to gain the court’s approval, the claimant
must first establish that he or she have a prima facie case.
In addition to proving that the claimant has a prima facie case, the court must also
be satisfied that the claimant is acting in good faith when filing the claim. This kind of
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scrutiny raises two issues of concern. First, the scrutiny shows a desire to safeguard the
rule in Foss v Harbottle. This can act as a deterrent to shareholders. Secondly, the great
degree of scrutiny will likely deter some foreign investors who might otherwise invest in a
venture in the UK.
In fact, research findings indicate that the UK’s derivative claim is predicated on
the company’s right to self-manage its affairs. In order for the court to justify interruption
of the company’s self-management, only rare circumstances will prevail. Therefore, any
shareholder wishing to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the company in the UK, will
have to go through a court vetting system. Therefore, the UK’s derivative claim is not the
appropriate model for which Saudi Arabia might want to follow.
Civil law countries such as Germany and France also have impressive derivative
claim laws and practices. However, Germany, like the UK provides for scrutiny by the
courts and pre-approval prior to allowing a derivative claim.

Moreover, German

shareholders must also hold a specific amount of shares in the company prior to initiating
a claim. France also requires that shareholders hold a specific amount of shares in the
company in order to file a derivative claim.
Elsewhere, China’s derivative claim practices and laws are lacking. Shareholders
must own a specific amount of shares in order to file a derivative claim. Regardless, in a
country where state enterprises are prominent it is hardly surprising that derivative claims
are rare in China.
Perhaps Japan has the best practice as it is far easier for minority shareholders to
file a derivative suite than in other jurisdictions. However, Japan also sets a minimum
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shareholding requirement so that many shareholders who do not hold the minimum number
of shares for six months will not be able to take action on the behalf of the company.
Based on the research findings, the laws and practices for launching and permitting
a derivative suite in the US represent the best practices. This is primarily because in the
US, any shareholder, regardless of the quantity of his or her shares, may file a reactive
derivative claim. This is an important issue because all shareholders are entitled to equal
protection regardless of the number of shares they hold in a company.
In Saudi Arabia, where a foreigner is likely to be a minority shareholder, the
exclusion from derivative claims is unappealing. Foreign investors are more likely to shop
around for a host state that will ensure that their interests and investments are protected.
Ultimately, this means that foreign investors are less likely to feel that their minority
shareholdings are protected under the laws of Saudi Arabia. It is therefore important that
Saudi Arabia make changes to its laws and practices for the derivative claim. Such changes
should ensure that all shareholders have equal protection.

5.3 Recommendations
Based on research findings it appears that the best practices for permitting a
derivative suite are those utilized on the US. In order to improve upon the derivative suit
laws and practices in Saudi Arabia it is recommended that some aspects of the US model
for derivative suite are adopted. Therefore, the following recommendations are made:
•

As in the US, Saudi Arabia should keep the right for any shareholders to file and
pursue a derivative suite. This is very important because all shareholders should
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feel equally protected. This is especially important for foreign investors who are
targeted by Saudi Arabia.
•

Saudi Arabia should also implement a practice and law that requires that action via
the derivative suite is only available when damages have been sustained. This sort
of limitation on action is important for safeguarding against the opening of
floodgates. This is also preferable to permitting a practice in which the courts
scrutinize the case and the claimant as is practiced in the UK.

•

Moreover, Saudi Arabia should ensure that once a claim is filed in the court, the
claimant and the company must cede authority over the claim to the court. This
kind of practice safeguards against the board of directors compromising the
derivative claim.

•

The Saudi Arabian law and practice for derivative claims should also provide that
shareholders seeking redress should first make a formal demand of the board of
directors for action. This kind of action ensures that directors are accountable for
malfeasance within and against the company. This should place directors under
pressure to avoid actions and consequences that can lead to a derivative claim.

•

Similar to the practice and law in the US, the board of directors should remain has
the right to appoint their own legal representatives to participate in the suit on behalf
of the company.

•

Saudi Arabia should also remove the requirement for approval for a derivative
claim by the General Assembly. This rule virtually ensures that no minority
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shareholder may file a derivative suite against the company since those sitting in
the General Assembly are likely to be owners and controllers.
•

The laws and practices in Saudi Arabia should ensure that only the court has the
authority to determine whether a claim has merits or not. This should never be a
decision for the board to make. The only decision the board should make is whether
to take action or to step aside while the shareholder or shareholders in question file
a formal derivative suite.

•

Saudi Arabia should provide specifications for when minority shareholders may file
a derivative claim. It is not enough to simply state that the action is available in the
event of a breach of fiduciary duties by shareholders. The list of specification
should be comprehensive and clear.

•

It is also important for Saudi Arabia to implement laws and practices that enhance
the degree of transparency and accountability shareholders might expect of their
directors. This is especially important in Saudi Arabia where company ownership
is primarily held by families. Families have been shown to dislike outsiders.
Transparency and accountability will not only help shareholders to obtain greater
protection, but will also open up avenues for identifying instances where a
derivative suit is necessary.

•

Saudi Arabia should also pass laws and implement practices that improve the
minority shareholder’s incentives for participating in the company’s meetings and
passage of resolutions. This is important for ensuring that minority shareholders
have access to information about the company’s day-to-day activities. By staying
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abreast of the company’s day-to-day activities, remote and minority shareholders
will be positioned to take action on behalf of the company when necessary. This
also puts the directors and other members of the executive management team on
notice that they are under scrutiny and must act on behalf of the company.
•

Saudi Arabia should also pass laws and implement practices that clearly define the
director’s duties in relation to the best interest of the company. With clear
definitions and descriptions of directors’ duties, shareholders will be in a much
better position to identify and demand protection of their rights and interests and
the rights and interest of the company.

5.4 Areas for Further Research
Even with Saudi's new Companies Act, still a few derivative claim was filed. At the
same time, prior to Saudi's implementation of its new laws placing limitations on the right
to file a derivative claim, Saudis shareholders were not active litigants in this regard. What
was missing in the literature was descriptions of various cases that were filed and how
those cases were decided.
It would therefore add to current knowledge on derivative claims if further research
was conducted on the cases that have been filed since various countries have made changes
to their laws and practices facilitating the derivative suite. Cases can shed light on the
grounds these claims are filed, the merits of these suites, and how courts in various
jurisdictions treat these claims. These cases will also provide insight into how well laws
and practices work for the protection of minority shareholders.
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Further research will also be necessary on the success and failures of derivative
claims since the implementation of new laws and practices. Countries such as Germany,
France, China and Japan are interesting areas of study as each of these countries have either
developed or emerging economies. The success and failures of derivative claims in these
countries can shed significant light on where Saudi Arabia is in terms of its laws and
practices and where it needs to make changes for improvements as it seeks to improve and
diversify its economy while targeting foreign investors.
Finally, in regards Article 80, which stated that the company “may be charged the
expenses incurred by the shareholder to file a claim against the company, whatever the
result thereof provided it was done” if the shareholder’s claim was filed in “good faith”, if
the shareholder provides the company with the “reason” for filing the claim and “did not
receive a reply within” one month; if the claim “serves the interest of the company” and if
the claim is “properly founded.” This new law might lead to an increase number or
derivative suit which might harm the reputation of the company. In addition, this practice
can not be seen in any comparative laws and regulations. Therefore, further research is
needed to shed the light on the impact of the new law and the need to remove it or add
more restriction on it.

5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter summarized research findings and in doing so identified the
appropriate laws and best practices for improving derivative claims in Saudi Arabia. In
identifying the appropriate laws and best practices for improving derivative claims in Saudi
Arabia, this chapter made recommendations accordingly. Areas for further research were
also added to this chapter.
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Ultimately, research findings revealed that the most appropriate laws and best
practices for a derivative claim are those implemented in the US, UK and Japan. When this
is added to the lack of shareholder protection and the limitations on the derivative suite in
Saudi Arabia, recommendations were made for changes in Saudi Arabia modelled after
laws and practices in the US.
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